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INTRODUCTION
The recent drafting and ratification of the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004 sparked contentious debates over
the compatibility of democratic governance, Islam, and Islamic law' in
Afghanistan as well as the impact of these institutions on women's rights.
2
Many women's rights advocates struggled to secure the inclusion of
constitutional provisions promoting sex and gender equality and reserving over
twenty percent of all seats in the Afghan Parliament for women.3 While they
succeeded in this regard, advocates have since expressed concern that the
impact of these provisions will be undermined by existing interpretations of
Islamic law that treat women differently-and less favorably-than men.4 They
1. Muslims believe Islamic law to be divine law setting forth individuals' duties to God and their
fellow human beings, based on human interpretation of Islam's foundational sources. In Sunni Islam, the
Qur'an, Sunna (practice of the Prophet Muhammad), ijma (consensus of the community), and qiyas
(reasoning by analogy) constitute the primary sources of law. See generally MOHAMMAD HASHIM
KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 16-116, 228-305 (3d ed. 2003); BERNARD WEISS,
THE SEARCH FOR GOD'S LAW 151-258 (1992). Shi'i Islam shares the Qur'an and ijma as principal
sources, but substitutes aql (reason) for qiyas and expands the concept of Sunna to include the practice
of the Shi'i Imams in addition to that of the Prophet Muhammad. See HOSSEIN MODARRESSI
TABATABA'I, AN INTRODUCTION TO SHT'T LAW 2 (1984). Islamic law is manifested in these sources
(shari 'a) or formulated in them (fiqh). One scholar has explained the distinction as follows:
The law embodied in the sources is shar'a proper-God's divine law. Islam's legal sources
articulate that law in general, principled terms. The law derived from the sources isfiqh-the
human attempt to understand and articulate God's divine law with respect to particular
circumstances of individual and social life. As one Islamic law scholar puts it, "[f]iqh
(literally "discernment") is a human attempt at knowing the Shar'a, the divinely ordained
'path' which only God knows perfectly. The word Shar'a shines more brightly and is seen
more reverentially than fiqh." Modem writers often conflate fiqh and sharVa, referring to
both as "Islamic law," and a similar problem runs through Islamic texts, where a derivative
of sharVa is often used to mean a static body offiqh.
Intisar Rabb, "We the Jurists": Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq & Prospects for Progressive Family
Law 21-22 (Spring 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citations omitted).
2. See, e.g., Cynthia Peters, New Afghan Constitution Only One Step on Long Road to Women's
Rights, NEW STANDARD, Jan. 17, 2004, available at http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2004-
01/17peters.cfm; Katha Pollitt, Theocracy Lite, NATION, Sept. 19, 2005, at 10.
3. Article 83 of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan provides that at least two female delegates
must be elected from each province to the Wolesi Jirga (Council of People), the lower house of the
national legislature. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 83, cl. 6, available at
http://www.jemb.org/eng/Legal%20FrameworkLegislation%20of/o2OReference/Constitution/
Constitution%20(English).pdf. Article 84 requires that one-half of all presidential appointees to the
Meshrano Jirga (Council of Elders), the upper house of the national legislature, must be women. 1d. art.
84. As a result, the constitution reserves twenty-five percent of the seats in the Wolesi Jirga and almost
seventeen percent of the seats in the Meshrano Jirga for women. The constitution, however, does not
address women's representation in lower levels of government. Indeed, women remain "excluded from
formal bodies of local governance," drawing criticism from observers who call for the institution of
quotas for women in provincial and district councils. DENIz KANDIYOTI, THE POLITICS OF GENDER AND
RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN 27 (2005), available at http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/
document.nsf/0/3050BE40DA5B871CC125704400534A7A?OpenDocument; Niaz A. Shah, The
Constitution of Afghanistan and Women's Rights, 13 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 239, 249 (2005).
4. See, e.g., Masuda Sultan, Afghan Constitution a Partial Victory for Women, WOMEN'S ENEWS,
Jan. 14, 2004, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/1674; Afghanistan: New Charter
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point to the potential tension between Article 22 of the constitution, which
explicitly states that "[a]ny kind of discrimination and distinction between
citizens of Afghanistan shall be forbidden. The citizens of Afghanistan, man or
woman, have equal rights and duties before the law," 5 and Article 3, which
mandates that "no law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy
religion of Islam in Afghanistan ' 6 and empowers the unelected jurists on
Afghanistan's Supreme Court to strike legislation for incompatibility with the
latter provision. 7 While the constitution falls short of requiring Islamic law to
form the basis of all legislation in Afghanistan, 8 it opens the possibility that a
judiciary long-dominated by hard-line Islamist jurists will use its power to
subvert gains for women's rights won in the battlefield of the Afghan
Parliament.
9
The fear that judicial review in the name of Islam will thwart progress
towards women's rights is not unfounded. The Taliban used extreme
interpretations of Islamic law to close girls' schools, prohibit women from
working outside the home almost entirely, require women to travel
accompanied by a male relative, mandate that women wear the burqa in public
places, and stone to death women convicted of adultery.10 Memories of the
Taliban's "gender apartheid" justified under the guise of Islam remain
Proposes Equal Rights, OFF OUR BACKS, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 4, available at http://findarticles.com/
p/articles/miqa3693/is_200401/ain9402380.
5. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 22.
6. Id. art. 3.
7. The 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan established judicial review in Article 121, which provides,
"At the request of the Government, or courts, the Supreme Court shall review the laws, legislative
decrees, international treaties as well as international covenants for their compliance with the
Constitution and their interpretation in accordance with the law." Id. art. 121.
8. Other constitutions arguably afford Islamic law an even larger role in governance than the 2004
Constitution of Afghanistan. For example, the Constitution of Egypt provides that "the principles of the
Islamic Shari'a are the main source of legislation." AL-DUSTR [Egyptian Constitution], reprinted in Al-
Muhamah [The Legal Profession], Dec. 1971, pt. 1, art. 2, translated in Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law
and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695, 723 (2004)
(emphasis added); see also Rabb, supra note 1, at 33-41 (presenting "three models of institutional
relations between ... government and [Islamic] jurists with respect to Islamic legal interpretation"
created by constitutions incorporating Islam).
9. Hannibal Travis, Freedom or Theocracy?. Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq, 3 Nw. U.
J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 4, 84 (2005) ("[W]hile [women] may be ensured a say in parliament, their ability to
pass laws improving women's plight in their country will be strictly limited by a veto power the
constitution grants to radical fundamentalists in the Afghan judiciary."). These fears form part of a
larger apprehension that a Supreme Court dominated by political Islamists could become "an
unaccountable body controlling the legislature, executive branch and electoral system on the pretext of
protecting Islam," in a manner reminiscent of the Council of Guardians in Iran. J. Alexander Thier,
Attacking Democracy from the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004, at A23.
10. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2001, § 5 (2002), available at http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/sa/8222.htm [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE]; Revolutionary
Ass'n of the Women of Afg. (RAWA), Some of the Restrictions Imposed by Taliban on Women in
Afghanistan, http://rawa.org/rules.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2007)
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understandably vivid in the minds of domestic and international women's rights
advocates alike." One observer recently commented,
It remains to be seen how the constitutional protection of women's
rights will compete with the fundamentalist interpretations of Islamic
law enforced in many parts of Afghanistan, which allow for girls to be
sold into marriage, give fathers and brothers control over female
members of the family, and punish women harshly for adultery and
prostitution. 
12
Another commentator expressed similar reservations about the impact of
parallel provisions proclaiming gender equality and incorporating Islamic law
in the 2005 Constitution of Iraq.1 3 Katha Pollitt recently asked in The Nation,
"How can women be equal before Islamic law, according to which they are
unequal?" 14 In response to her own question, she recounted the parade of
Islamic law horrors that, she claims, currently afflict women in Iran and
promise to confront women in Iraq, where Islamic law occupies a place in the
new constitution.
[I]f Iraq turns out to resemble Iran... women have a lot to look
forward to: being married off at the age of 9, being a co-wife, having
unequal rights to divorce and child custody, inheriting half as much as
their brothers, having their testimony in court counted as half that of
men, winning a rape conviction only if the crime was witnessed by
four male Muslims, being imprisoned and flogged for premarital sex,
being executed for adultery, needing mandatory permission from
husband or father to work, study or travel. 15
Pollitt's critique is well-intentioned, for it focuses on promoting the rights
of women in countries featuring Islamic law. It is grounded, however, upon two
central assumptions: first, that what is understood as required by "Islamic law"
11. The Taliban gained international notoriety for "institutionaliz[ing] gender apartheid," which it
enforced by publicly beating women who failed to conform. Mark A. Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and
Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for the Women of Afghanistan, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 349, 355
(2004); see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 10, § 5; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, A "Benign" Apartheid.
How Gender Apartheid Has Been Rationalized, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237, 274-75
(2000). The Taliban "cloaked" its gender policy in Islam. Drumbl, supra, at 366-67; see also LARRY P.
GOODSON, AFGHANISTAN'S ENDLESS WAR: STATE FAILURE, REGIONAL POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF THE
TALIBAN 118-20 (2001); NEAMATOLLAH NOJUMI, THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN: MASS
MOBILIZATION, CIVIL WAR, AND THE FUTURE OF THE REGION 154-55 (2002) ("The Taliban enforced
numerous law decrees according to their interpretation ofShari 'ah."). Commentators note, however, that
Taliban policies were more reflective of rural Pashtun practices or a "culture of war" than Islam.
Drumbl, supra, at 366.
12. Peters, supra note 2.
13. Article 14 of the 2005 Constitution of Iraq provides that "Iraqis are equal before the law
without discrimination based on gender." AL-DUSTOR AL-'IRAQT [Iraqi Constitution] (2005), art. 14,
available at http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/20704/11332732689iraqi-constitution ar.pdf/
iraqi_constitution ar.pdf. An unofficial English translation approved by the Iraqi government can be
found at http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/20704/l 1332732681 iraqi constitution en.pdf/
iraqi constitution en.pdf. Article 2 provides that "Islam... is a fundamental source of legislation" and
prohibits the establishment of any law that "contradicts the established provisions of Islam." Id. art. 2.
14. Pollitt, supra note 2.
15. Id.
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indeed reflects Islamic legal precepts rather than customary law or social
norms; and second, that formal Islamic law provisions are definitive and closed
to contestation. Starting from these assumptions, Pollitt concludes that the
constitutional incorporation of Islamic law will necessarily curtail women's
rights.
Pollitt's conclusion that a constitutional status for Islam will hurt rather
than help women, and that conclusion's concomitant assumptions, merits
critique. As Islamic scholars have long recognized and Western observers have
more recently appreciated, Islam and Islamic law are not uniform, but open to a
vast spectrum of interpretations. 16 Islam is a system of beliefs based upon two
principal sources: the Qur'an, which is believed to be the word of God as
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad; and the Sunna, which consists of the
Prophet's practices. 17 "The Qur'an is the foundation of Islamic Law. The
sunnah... is used as a secondary source for further clarification and
guidance."18 Rather than dictating any single meaning, these sources have
spurred divergent and multiple understandings. Jurists have used the Islamic
legal doctrine of itihad, the "exercis[e] [of] independent juristic reasoning,"'19
to derive from the Qur'an and Sunna a wide-ranging set of legal determinations
known as "Islamic law." 20 Across the Islamic world today, progressive
16. See Isobel Coleman, Women, Islam, and the New Iraq, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 24,
24-27, available at http://foreignaffairs.org/20060101faessay85104/isobel-coleman/women-islam-and-
the-new-iraq.html; see also infra note 20.
17. Khaled Abou El Fad], Islam and the State: A Short History, in DEMOCRACY AND ISLAM IN THE
NEW CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN app. A at 13 (Cheryl Benard & Nina Hachigian eds., 2003),
available at http://rand.org/pubs/confproceedings/2005/CF186.pdf; Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Islamic
Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-5 (1992). The Sunna
refers to the practices of the Prophet "in the form of words, actions, approvals or even silence." MAWIL
IZZI DIEN, ISLAMIC LAW: FROM HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS TO CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE 38 (2004).
18. Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women's Rights, 12 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 6 (1997) [hereinafter al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom]. Both Sunni and Shi'i
Muslims regard the Qur'an and Sunna to be primary sources of Islamic law, although Shi'i include
immamic practice in their conception of Sunna. See supra note I (discussing distinctions between
primary and secondary sources of law among the different branches of Islam).
19. ABDULAH AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1990) [hereinafter ISLAMIC REFORMATION]. "Where the Qur'an
and sunnah leave a question unanswered or unresolved, Muslim scholars resort to iitihad (the science of
interpretation and rule making)." al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom, supra note 18. "Performing ijtihad
meant looking for knowledge about God's law in four 'sources,"' the Qur'an, Sunna (as recorded in
hadith), yma (consensus of the community), and qiyas (reasoning by analogy). Clark B. Lombardi &
Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari'a Threaten Human Rights?: How
Egypt's Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 379, 397 (2006).
20. Different schools of Islamic law and even different jurists of the same school vary in their
derivation of Islamic legal precepts from the Qur'an and Sunna. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Human
Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, A Preliminary
Inquiry, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 19 (1990). Divergent and conflicting views are accepted as valid and
legitimate. Id. at 19-20. Islamic law therefore is not uniform or set forth in any single code, but
"constitutes several schools of jurisprudential thought that are considered equally orthodox and
authoritative." El Fadl, supra note 17. As a result, one scholar has argued that "Islamic law does not aim
at uniformity." A. A. Oba, Islamic Law as Customary Law: The Changing Perspective in Nigeria, 51
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 817, 821 (2002). Today, the four main Sunni schools of law are the Hanbali, Shafi,
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Muslims in countries as varied as Iran, Morocco, and Malaysia are utilizing this
heterogeneity to advocate interpretations of Islamic law that accommodate or
actively promote women's rights.2 1 In some states, their interpretations have
actually influenced lawmaking, as demonstrated by the exemplary reform in
2004 of the Mudawana, the Moroccan Family Code, which raised the legal age
of marriage for both men and women to eighteen, granted both spouses status
as legal heads of the family, and placed severe procedural constraints on men's
ability to engage in polygamy. 22 Moreover, as a pragmatic matter, the
Maliki, and Hanaf. The two main Shi'i schools are the J'afari (or Ithna Ashari) and the Zaydi. El Fadl,
supra note 17. See generally Roy Parviz Mottahedeb, Introduction to MUJAMMAD BAQIR AS-$ADR,
LESSONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 4-17 (Roy Parviz Mottahedeh trans., 2003). In Afghanistan, the
Sunni population primarily follows the Hanaf! school, while the Shi'i population predominantly follows
the Jafari school. El Fadl, supra note 17, app. A at 13. For an overview of the development of Islamic
law, see Rabb, supra note 1, app. 1.
21. Examples of transnational and domestic advocacy promoting women's rights through
implementation or reform of Islamic law abound. Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) is a
transnational group that provides activists throughout the Muslim world with information on progressive
Islamic law for use in local women's rights advocacy. About Women Living Under Muslim Laws,
http://www.wluml.org/english/about.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2007); see also Madhavi Sunder,
Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1434-43 (2003) (detailing WLUML's efforts to assist Muslim
women from diverse countries in exchanging their own understandings of Islam that promote their
human rights). In Malaysia, Sisters in Islam (SIS) has actively challenged the Parti Islam se-Malaysia's
extremist interpretations of Islam by articulating Islamic law interpretations that would abolish
polygamy, grant women relatively liberal rights to divorce and maintenance, and include women as
qadis (judges) in the syariah (Islamic) court system, which administers personal and family law. See
Memorandum on Reform of the Islamic Family Laws and the Administration of Justice in the Syariah
System in Malaysia from Sisters in Islam to Gov't of Malay. (Jan. 4, 1997), available at
http://www.sistersinislam.org.my/memo/040197.htm; Memorandum on Reform of the Islamic Family
Laws on Polygamy from Sisters in Islam & Ass'n of Women Lawyers to Tun Dr. Mahathir bin
Mohamad, Prime Minister, Malay. (Dec. 11, 1996), available at http://www.sistersinislam.org.my/
memo/Il 11296.htm; Nik Noriani Nik Badli Shah, Women as Judges (Sisters in Islam), available at
http://www.sistersinislam.org.my/womenjudgescPartl.doc (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). Domestic
advocates have also argued from Islamic criminal law to promote women's rights. In a well-publicized
case, Nigerian women's rights advocates successfully defended Amina Lawal from a sentence of death
by stoning for adultery by arguing that her trial and sentence violated Islamic law in an appeal within the
Islamic court system, rather than through removal to secular court. Vanessa von Struensee, Stoning,
Shari'a, and Human Rights Law in Nigeria, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 405, 405-10 (2005).
22. Global Rights, The Moroccan Family Code (unofficial English translation) [hereinafter
Moroccan Family Code], available at http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/Moudawana-
English_Translation.pdfdoclD=3106 (last visited Feb. 27, 2007); Fatima Sadiqi, The Impact of
Islamization on Moroccan Feminisms, 32 SIGNS 32, 39 app. (2006); Mudawwanat al-usra [Family
Code] (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov.ma (last visited Jan. 15, 2007). Reform of the
Moroccan Family Code began as a secular project promoted by the Moroccan NGO Union de l'Action
Feminine with the support of government and civil society reformers but vigorous opposition from
Islamists and Islamic jurists. Rabb, supra note 1, at 43. King Muhammad VI "halted the purely secular
governmental reform projects and convened a reform commission with a mandate to resolve the
secularist-Islamic/juristic differences and propose mutually-agreeable reforms for personal status laws."
Id. at 44. When presenting the resulting reforms for parliamentary approval in 2003, the King explicitly
remarked that the reforms were grounded in Islam and Islamic law. Moroccan Family Code, supra.
Fatima Sadiqi has highlighted the contribution of both liberal and Islamic feminists' "involvement in
Islamic feminist discourse" to the passage of the 2004 reforms. Sadiqi, supra, at 36. The election of
thirty-five women to parliament in 2002 under the quota system for women's representation in elections
and the unity of female parliamentarians of all shades of the Islamic-secular spectrum around demands
for women's civil rights "accelerated the process of law reforms," including the reform of the Moroccan
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condemnation of Islam and Islamic law as inherently inimical to women's
rights fails to serve the interests of women in countries where purely secular
arguments for women's rights are easily discounted as "Western" constructions
and where, for better or worse, Islam and Islamic law are a part of democratic
governance and legal structure.
23
In recent decades, many of these progressive voices have been those of
Muslim women. Throughout the Muslim world, women activists-so-called
"Islamic feminists"-have emerged to promote the political, economic, and
social empowerment of women by reinterpreting the original sources of Islamic
law, the Qur'an and hadith (the recorded Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad), to
develop, disseminate, and deploy egalitarian interpretations of Islamic law.
24
Women like the members of Sisters in Islam in Malaysia, the members of
Baobab for Women's Human Rights in Nigeria, and the contributors to Zanan
Family Code. Id. at 37-38. The 2004 reforms were thus the result, in part, of a concerted attempt to
harmonize women's demands for their rights with Islamic law.
23. In Afghanistan, membership in a known secular feminist organization-even one with purely
Afghan roots-is used to attack and discredit female leaders. Well-known Afghan member of parliament
Malalai Joya reports that many of her enemies accuse her of membership in RAWA, an indigenous
group with a secular orientation formed during the Soviet occupation. Tom Coghlan, Afghan MP Says
She Will Not Be Silenced, BBC NEWS, Jan. 27, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/Il/hi/world/southasia/
4606174.stm.
24. "Islamic feminism" has been defined as "a feminist discourse and practice articulated within an
Islamic paradigm," which emerged in various locations throughout the world during the 1990s. Margot
Badran, Islamic Feminism: What's in a Name?, AL-AHRAM WKLY. ONLINE, Jan. 17-23, 2002,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/569/cul.htm. The term has been used to describe women from a
multitude of countries who use diverse interpretive methodologies and strategies to promote women's
empowerment through interpretation and reinterpretation of Islamic law, and through an emphasis on the
Islamic values of equality, justice, compassion, and autonomy. For example, in Iran, contributors to the
women's magazine Zanan actively encourage women to engage in the reinterpretation of current Islamic
law precepts to realize women's rights. Shahla Shirkat, the editor-in-chief of Zanan, told Azadeh Kian,
Radical legal changes are needed to solve women's problems. Many articles of the civil code
are based on the Shari 'a, which must, therefore, be reinterpreted. Moreover, women should
be involved in this undertaking. Our understanding of religion varies in each historical
period, and religious interpretations should account for factors of time and space ....
Azadeh Kian, Women and Politics in Post-Islamist Iran: The Gender Conscious Drive to Change, 24
BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 75, 91 (1997). Notably, Islamic feminism also encompasses calls for the
empowerment of women by modernist male scholars of Islamic law and jurisprudence such as those
writing in the pages of the popular Iranian magazine Zan-i Ruz. Id. at 93.
In recent years, there has been an explosion of interest in Islamic feminism. Two large
international conferences on the subject took place in Paris and Barcelona in 2006. Press Release,
Women Living Under Muslim Laws, International UNESCO Seminar on 'Islamic Feminism' (Aug. 7,
2006), available at http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd[ 157]=x- 157-541378; Second
International Congress on Islamic Feminism, http://www.feminismeislamic.org/eng/ (last visited Feb.
27, 2007).
Some scholars, however, have questioned the possibility of Islamic feminism. See, e.g.,
Shahrzad Mojab, The Politics of Theorizing 'Islamic Feminism': Implications for International Feminist
Movements, WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAWS DOSSIER 23/24, at 64, 71 (2001), available at
http://www.wluml.org/english/pubs/pdf/dossier23-24/D23-24.pdf ("The positing of an Islamic feminist
consciousness ... is ... questionable."). But see Valentine M. Moghadam, Islamic Feminism and Its
Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate, 27 SIGNS 1135, 1165 (2002) ("[I]f feminists should be
defined by their praxis rather than by a strict ideology, and if a feminist politics is shaped by its specific
historical, political and cultural contexts, then it should be possible to identify Islamic feminism as one
feminism among many.").
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and Zan-i-Ruz magazines in Iran have urged women to actively engage Islamic
law.25 Through their own interpretation of original sources and reinterpretation
of orthodox provisions, they have concluded that Islamic law permits women to
serve as judges26 and the chief executives of states, establishes equal rights
for women and men to initiate divorce,28 and strictly controls or even prohibits
29polygamy. While Islamic feminists have not been consistently successful at
influencing legislation or judicial interpretation, they have contributed to
progressive reforms of Islamic law that expanded women's formal rights and
have sought to enhance their ability to exercise these rights in countries as
diverse as Morocco, Malaysia, and Iran.30  Their efforts and successes
problematize the assumptions underlying Pollitt's critique, namely that what is
claimed to be required by Islamic law reflects Islamic legal precepts rather than
25. See supra note 21 (discussing Sisters in Islam); supra note 24 (discussing Zanan and Zan-i-
Ruz); see also Herstory of BAOBAB for Women's Human Rights, http://www.baobabwomen.org/
history.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
26. Badli Shah, supra note 21. In 1992, Zanan issued a series of articles in which it argued that the
exclusion of women from the judiciary was not justified by the principal Islamic texts, nor supported by
any uniform opinion of religious authorities. Kian, supra note 24, at 92. Another magazine, Farzaneh,
agreed with this position the following year. Id.
27. Contrary to the directive of the Ayatollah Khomeini and Article 115 of the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian women have argued that Islam permits women to serve as the
country's leader. Haleh Afshar, Women and Politics in Iran, 12 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 188, 197-98 (2000).
Faizeh Rafsanjani, one often women elected to the Majlis (Iranian Parliament) in 1996, argued publicly
that a woman may run for and hold the position of President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Kian, supra
note 24, at 75, 86.
28. Press Release, Sisters in Islam, SMS Divorce Does Not Conform to the Quranic Principle of
Ihsan (Kindness) (July 29, 2003), available at http://www.sistersinislam.org.my/lte/29072003.htm.
29. SISTERS IN ISLAM, Introduction to ISLAM AND POLYGAMY (2001), available at
http://www.sistersinislam.org.my/pubs-polygamy.htm.
30. In Morocco, King Muhammad VI grounded the legitimacy of the 2004 Moroccan Family Code,
which introduced reforms to promote women's rights and gender equality, in the Qur'an, the words of
the Prophet Muhammad, and the King's role as Amir al Muminin, Commander of the Faithful.
Moroccan Family Code, supra note 22, at pmbl. paras. 27-28; Laura A. Weingartner, Comment: Family
Law & Reform in Morocco-The Mudawana: Modernist Islam and Women's Rights in the Code of
Personal Status, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 687, 699, 708 (2005). In Malaysia, federal authorities
adopted the 1984 Islamic Family Law Enactment for the Federal Territories, "one of the most
enlightened laws among Muslim countries," by choosing reforms from among the four Sunni Islamic
schools of jurisprudence. Memorandum on Reform of the Islamic Family Laws and the Administration
of Justice in the Syariah System in Malaysia, supra note 21. This law permits women to petition a court
for annulment of a marriage on twelve different grounds, grants them compensation if their husbands
unjustly divorce them, and entitles them to a portion of jointly acquired marital assets upon divorce. Id.
Iran witnessed the 1992 Amendments to Divorce Law, which limited men's right to unilaterally divorce
their wives (talaq). This reform was justified by the argument that "Islam placed marriage in the highest
regard," and it granted women post-divorce maintenance, oriat al-mesl, in a provision drafted by women
who interpreted this legal right from Islamic texts. Arzoo Osanloo, At the Juncture of Islam and
Republic: Socio-legal Constructions of Women's Rights in Iran 178 (August 2000) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School); see
also PARVIN PAIDAR, WOMEN AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY IRAN 293 (1995)
(discussing a bill introduced in 1989 that proposed to limit men's unilateral divorce rights). One scholar
has suggested that the 1992 reforms represent a "feminist[] interpretation ofshari 'a divorce provisions."
Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Stretching the Limits: A Feminist Reading of the Shari'a in Post-Khomeini Iran, in
FEMINISM AND ISLAM: LEGAL AND LITERARY PERSPECTIVES 285, 286 (Mai Yamani ed., 1996).
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customary law or social norms, and that formal Islamic law provisions are fixed
and uncontested.
The debates surrounding the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan and the
explosion of Islamic feminism around the world thus raise an important
question about the future of women's rights advocacy in Afghanistan. This
Comment rejects Pollitt's conclusion that the incorporation of Islam in
Afghanistan's new constitution will necessarily or definitively result in the
curtailment of women's rights. It suggests instead that the impact of the 2004
Constitution of Afghanistan is fundamentally an empirical question, one that
requires an understanding of the text of the document as well as the context in
which it is implemented-a context characterized by contestation over the
interpretation and enforcement of Islamic law, a judiciary and legal system with
distinctive features, an unstable and degrading security situation, and women's
low socio-economic status. A consideration of these factors suggests that the
new constitution provides Afghan women a stage from which they may
advocate to empower women through strategies grounded in Islam, a stage that
is vastly expanded from the narrow space available under the Taliban or earlier
governments, even as it remains limited by contemporary political,
institutional, and social constraints.
Part I describes the contestation over Islamic law in Afghanistan through
one example of Islamic feminist advocacy: the drafting and promotion of the
Afghan Women's Bill of Rights. This Part demonstrates that a number of
women in Afghanistan seek to secure women's political, economic, and social
empowerment through Islamically-grounded advocacy both out of sincere
belief and for pragmatic reasons. These women believe that Islam grants more
rights than they are currently able to exercise. Many also find that framing
secular demands in the language and idioms of Islam is necessary for political
legitimacy in the socio-political context of Afghanistan. Whether their purpose
is sincere, strategic, or both, these advocates use Islam as their starting point for
improving the status and rights of women in Afghanistan. The substance of
their demands and the language they employ challenge assumptions by both
Muslims and non-Muslims that current constraints on women's rights are
accurately understood as "Islamic," and that Islamic law itself is determinate
and hostile to promoting women's rights or opportunities.
Part II analyzes the ways in which the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan
simultaneously empowers and constrains advocates' abilities to promote
women's rights using arguments grounded in Islam. The constitution sets forth
several important substantive rights for Afghan women and reinforces the
state's obligation to uphold its international commitments, including
commitments to human rights conventions setting forth women's rights.
Moreover, by reserving seats for women in the Afghan Parliament, the
constitution may increase the possibility that laws favoring women's rights will
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be proposed, debated, and passed by the legislature.31 Nevertheless, it
potentially restricts women's space and ability to engage in such advocacy by
empowering the Supreme Court to review laws for compatibility with the
"tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan."32 While
Islamic feminists may encourage judges to adopt more feminist interpretations
of Islamic law, this approach may or may not succeed depending on who is
sitting on the Supreme Court. This analysis of the competing provisions of
Afghanistan's new constitution reveals that it is impossible to conclude whether
the document on the whole benefits or harms women without a more
contextualized inquiry.
Finally, Part III explores the legal and extra-legal barriers that further limit
the possibility that Islamic feminist advocacy will enact concrete change
through the passage and implementation of laws in Afghanistan. These
constraints include structural characteristics of the Afghan legal system, such as
the politicization and gender-bias of the judiciary, the weakness of the formal
legal system, and the lack of clarity surrounding applicable law. Other extra-
legal constraints include the pervasive lack of security in Afghanistan and
women's low socio-economic status. While the 2004 Constitution of
Afghanistan opens up spaces for legal reform grounded in Islam to promote
women's rights, these challenges hamper the institution of such reforms and
their ability to enable women to exercise their rights on the ground.
By examining the contestation of Islamic law by Islamic feminists in
Afghanistan, looking closely at the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, and
exploring existing legal and extra-legal constraints on the promotion of
women's rights through law, this Comment offers a contextualized approach to
analyzing the impact of Islam and constitutionalism on women's rights in one
3 1. There is an expansive literature on the potential impact of reservations for women on electoral
lists or in national legislatures on women's equality in political representation as well as policy
development and implementation. See Charles S. Maier & Jytte Klausen, Introduction: New
Perspectives on the Use of Parity Mandates and Quotas To Guarantee Equality Between Men and
Women, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN?: ASSURING EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE AND
THE UNITED STATES 3, 10-12 (Jytte Klausen & Charles S. Maier eds., 2001) (discussing the
consequences of parity measures and quotas for women on gender inequality in politics and other
spheres) [hereinafter HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN?]; Jane Mansbridge, The Descriptive Political
Representation of Gender: An Anti-Essentialist Argument, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN?, supra,
at 19, 21-29, 33 (arguing for measures to produce women's political representation commensurate with
their proportion of the population on the grounds that it enhances democracy by addressing the
"[c]ommunicative distrust between men and women," the "uncrystallized interests" of women as a
group, and "[w]omen's historically subordinate political status"); Pipa Norris, Breaking the Barriers:
Positive Discrimination Policies for Women, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN?, supra, at 89, 102-07
(describing the impact of quotas for women in internal party candidate lists on women's representation
in national parliamentary politics in the United Kingdom). For a discussion of the policy impact of
reservations for women in local government, see Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, Women
as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1409,
1427-34, 1440 (2004) (finding that the constitutional reservation of positions for women on local
councils in India "has important effects on policy decisions at the local level").
32. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 3; see also id. art. 21 (discussing
judicial review of laws for compliance with the constitution).
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country. It reveals that there is good reason to reject the central assumptions
underlying Pollitt's critique-that what is often characterized as "Islamic law"
reflects Islamic legal precepts rather than customary law or social norms, and
that formal Islamic law precepts are definitive and closed to dispute. It also
challenges observers like Pollitt who conclude without much inquiry that
reference to Islam or Islamic law in the constitutions of predominantly Muslim
countries will necessarily harm women. While Islamic feminists in Afghanistan
face significant constraints that must be acknowledged and addressed, they may
nevertheless use their country's new constitution as a springboard to promote
women's rights.
I. SHAPING THE CONTOURS OF ISLAMIC LAW: ISLAMIC FEMINISM AND THE
AFGHAN WOMEN'S BILL OF RIGHTS
Muslim women throughout the world challenge constraints upon their
rights, opportunities, and freedoms by contesting proffered interpretations of
Islamic law as man-made products, rather than the unchanging word of God.
They seek to redefine the "tenets and provisions" of Islamic law as a basis for
promoting reforms to improve women's lives. Their advocacy within the
framework of Islam is often the result of sincere belief or strategic
considerations, either singly or in some combination.
Many Muslim women engaging in Islamic feminist advocacy sincerely
believe that Islam affords women, at least, greater rights than they are able to
exercise in practice and, at best, equal rights with men. Lina Abirafeh, the
former Country Director of Women-for-Women International, indicates that
"Afghan women feel strongly that Islam, more than any other religion,
guarantees equal rights to men and women." 33 The Max Planck Institute
reported, however, that seventy percent of men and eighty to eighty-five
percent of women interviewed in field research in Afghanistan were unaware of
the rights afforded to women in Islam. 34 Advocates such as Fatima Galiani,
director of Afghanistan's Red Crescent and a trained Islamic lawyer who
participated in the constitutional Loya Jirga, suggest that the general lack of
education as to Islamic law and women's rights may contribute to women's
disempowerment. Galiani recently stated in an interview that in her opinion, it
is not Islam itself, but the fact that most Muslim women do not know what
Islam is, or what the rights of women within it are, that "has created the best
opportunity for men to abuse this situation and enforce male-oriented
33. Lina Abirafeh, The Role of Religion in the Lives of Women in the New Afghanistan, I CRITICAL
HALF 36, 36 (2003).
34. MAX PLANCK INST., FAMILY STRUCTURES AND FAMILY LAW IN AFGHANISTAN: A REPORT ON
THE FACT-FINDING MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN 16 (2005), http://www.mpipriv-hh.mpg.de/deutsch/
Forschung/LaufendeProjekte/Afghanistan/MP1-ReportFamily.pdf [hereinafter MPI REPORT].
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traditions, or whatever suits them to oppress women." 35 Some women seek to
redress this problem by implementing what they believe are women's rights
under Islam, rights that are more expansive than those currently available to
women on the ground. Abirafeh observes that Afghan women "want to search
for answers in the Koran, or through other practicing Muslims. And they want
to know more about Islam and the rights that it affords them." 36 It should be no
surprise then that many demands by Afghan women are founded upon sincere
conviction in Islamic moral and ethical principles and a concomitant desire to
institute Islamic law.
Strategic concerns are similarly central to the choice of many Muslim
women to set forth their demands for rights via references to Islamic rights and
duties. Decades of conflict involving foreign forces have made Afghans
skeptical of international interventions. 37 As a result, Islam has been a unifying
force, providing "continuity and predictability." 38 In this context, "[n]umerous
female Afghan members of NGOs and government believe that the best and
only way to progress women's rights is to work within the framework of
Islam . . .,,39 During the constitution-making process, for example, advocates
were sensitive to the need to ensure that women's rights claims were "not...
perceived as imposed by foreign interests. ' 4° This concern has not dissipated
since the adoption of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan. One scholar
reported that during her interviews with female candidates for Afghanistan's
first direct parliamentary elections in September 2005, the women went to great
lengths to stress that they were devout Muslims. 4 1 She also indicated that "[a]
few men admitted-but never on the record-that they viewed an Islamic
discourse as the only foolproof and strategic means to build support for
women's rights in Afghanistan. ' '42 In a country where decades of invasion and
war have generated widespread and deep-seated suspicion of foreigners and
foreign ideas, advocates may decide to frame calls for women's rights in the
context of Islam as a strategic move to gain legitimacy for women's rights
amongst a mainstream Muslim population and to prevent backlash.
35. Women Living Under Muslim Laws, Afghanistan: Fatima Galiani-Promoting Women's
Rights Under Islam, May 30, 2006, http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B I 57%5D
=x157-53769 1.
36. Abirafeh, supra note 33.
37. Drumbl, supra note 11, at 353.
38. Id.
39. AMNESTY INT'L, AFGHANISTAN: WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK-A SYSTEMATIC FAILURE TO
PROTECT 26 (2005), http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASAI 10072005ENGLISH/$File/
ASA 1100705.pdf [hereinafter WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK].
40. Horia Mosadiq, The New Afghan Constitution: How Women Succeeded in Ensuring Certain
Rights and What Challenges Remain, 3 CRITICAL HALF 29, 30 (2005).
41. Leela Jacinto, Abandoning the Wardrobe and Reclaiming Religion in the Discourse on Afghan
Women's Islamic Rights, 32 SIGNS 9, 10 (2006).
42. Id.
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Several features common to the heterogeneous calls for change from
Islamic feminists are apparent in the 2003 Afghan Women's Bill of Rights.43 On
September 5, 2003, forty-five ethnically diverse women from across
Afghanistan met in Kandahar at the third annual conference of Women for
Afghan Women to demand that the new constitution incorporate explicit
safeguards for women. 44 Dismayed by the lack of protections for women in the
draft constitution, the group formulated an Afghan Women's Bill of Rights, a
document that contains twenty-one specific demands to elevate women's
status; promote their participation in economic, civic, and public life; and
improve their material well-being. These demands included calls for a right to
mandatory education through secondary school for all girls and women,
protection and security for women, freedom of speech, equal pay for equal
work, the right to participate fully and at the highest levels in economic and
commercial life, and equal representation in the government.45  Women
distributed the Afghan Women's Bill of Rights throughout the country to gather
support for these specific constitutional rights for women and presented the
document to President Hamid Karzai, the Constitutional Commission, and the
Minister of Women's Affairs, Habiba Sarabi.46 Despite promises by President
Karzai and members of the constitutional drafting commission, their efforts
were unrewarded; not a single provision of the Afghan Women's Bill of Rights
was included in the constitution, which remains largely gender-neutral.4 7
From its first sentence, the Afghan Women's Bill of Rights is grounded in
its authors' identities as Muslim women. The drafters explicitly identify
themselves and the group on behalf of whom they write in the opening line of
the document: "[W]e, the Afghan Muslim participants in the conference,
'Women and the Constitution: Kandahar 2003' ... make the following
43. CONFERENCE ON WOMEN & THE CONSTITUTION: KANDAHAR 2003, AFGHAN WOMEN'S BILL
OF RIGHTS (Sept. 5, 2003), available at http://www.womenforafghanwomen.org/events/
BillofRights.html [hereinafter AFGHAN WOMEN'S BILL OF RIGHTS].
44. Id. The conference, entitled "Women and the Constitution: Kandahar 2003," was held in "the
former Taliban stronghold of Kandahar" and involved both "educated and under-educated" female
leaders in the "women's and human rights" movement in Afghanistan. Id. The participants debated and
unanimously assented to each provision included in the Afghan Women's Bill of Rights. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.; Sultan, supra note 4.
47. President Karzai and members of the Constitutional Commission promised the advocates that
all of the provisions of the Afghan Women 's Bill of Rights would be included in the constitution, except
for Article 14, which sought to set the legal age for marriage at eighteen for both women and men. Laura
Grenfell, The Participation of Afghan Women in the Reconstruction Process, 12 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Fall
2004, at 22, 23. However, the resulting 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan did not incorporate the gender-
specific provisions of the Afghan Women 's Bill of Rights. The document mentions "woman" or
"women" three times: in Article 22's equality provision, Article 44's provision for the creation of a
"balanced education for women," and Article 53's provision for financial aid for women without
"caretakers." CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004) arts. 22, 44, 53. It mentions "mother"
once in Article 54, which calls for the adoption of "necessary measures" in order "to attain the physical
and spiritual health of the family, especially of the child and mother." Id. art. 54.
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demands on behalf of the women of Afghanistan. ' '48 By presenting their
Afghan and Islamic credentials early in the document, the drafters made an
important strategic move. While framing their demands within the Western
template of a bill of rights,49 these women established from the very beginning
that they are not Western interlopers, but indigenous Afghans and sincere
adherents of Islam who are legitimate and adequate representatives of the
women of Afghanistan. The deliberateness of their strategic choice is illustrated
by the fact that the demands in the Afghan Women's Bill of Rights are not
explicitly linked to rights or principles drawn from Islam, save one exception.
By prefacing what may be considered largely "secular" demands with an
introduction that clearly states that they are made by and for Muslim women,
the Afghan Women's Bill of Rights demonstrates that advocates assign strategic
importance to framing demands for women's rights in the context of Islam.
50
The drafters' choices also suggest that their motivation to promote change
within an Islamic framework went beyond strategic considerations to
encompass sincere conviction. They explicitly framed one demand in the
document within the context of Islam: the call to enable Afghan women to
exercise their "[r]ights to marry and divorce according to Islam."51 Rights to
marry and divorce are fundamental to women's ability to operate as
autonomous human beings, particularly insofar as they permit women to escape
coerced marriages and domestic abuse, and to choose their marital partners.
The Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) directs states to ensure that women exercise the same rights
to marry and divorce as men.52 Domestic and international observers have
documented the ways in which women's ability to choose their spouses and
initiate divorce are routinely denied in Afghanistan, resulting in serious human
rights abuses.53
48. AFGHAN WOMEN'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43. The writers of the Afghan Women 's Bill of
Rights also carefully documented their geographic diversity, drawing from Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif,
Kandahar, Herat, Wardak, Jousjan, Badakhshan, Samangan, Farah, Logar, Gardez, Kapisa, Uruzgan,
Paktia, Helmand, Baghlan, and Sar-e-Pul.
49. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X; DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN & OF THE CITIZEN
(1789).
50. Fifteen of the sixteen concrete demands set forth in the Afghan Women's Bill of Rights are
presented without any reference to Islam. The top four demands promote women's socio-economic
rights, including their entitlement to education, health services, and support for those whose husbands
have disappeared. AFGHAN WOMEN'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43.
51. Id. art. 7 (emphasis added).
52. Article 16 of CEDAW provides that "State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in
particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women" that women exercise the same rights
as men to enter into marriage; consent to marriage; freely choose a spouse; dissolve a marriage; own,
acquire, and administer property; and parent their children. United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, art. 16, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
53. WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK, supra note 39, at 12-17 (discussing the phenomenon in
Afghanistan of forced marriage, including child marriage, which "by definition constitute[s] forced
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In contrast to CEDAW, Islamic law grants women and men different rights
to marriage and divorce. The ways in which these rights differ by gender varies
among the schools of law in both Sunni and Shi'i Islam.54 Thus, in demanding
rights to marriage and divorce according to Islam rather than the simpler
formulation of "equal" rights to marriage and divorce, the drafters of the
Afghan Women's Bill of Rights send several messages.
First, and most fundamentally, they communicate the perception that a gap
exists between Afghan women's actual abilities to marry and divorce and the
rights that Islamic law affords them. For example, in Afghanistan, ninety
percent of the population are adherents of Sunni Islam and follow the Hanafi
school of law, which grants women fewer grounds for dissolving or leaving a
marriage than do other Sunni schools of law.55 Hanafi jurisprudence does
permit women to terminate a marriage through khul (mutual consent) and by
petitioning a court forfaskh (judicial order of annulment) and/or tafriq (judicial
marriage, as a child cannot be considered to have consented freely"); Revolutionary Ass'n of the
Women of Afghanistan, http://www.rawa.org/reports3.html#Exec (last visited Feb. 3, 2007)
(summarizing article from The News dated Nov. 11, 1995, reporting hanging of a widow for refusing to
marry her deceased husband's cousin).
54. For a description of the six main schools of Sunni and Shi'i law, see supra note 20. Both Sunni
and Shi'i schools recognize four general types of divorce: (1) unilateral divorce initiated by the husband
(talaq), (2) divorce by mutual consent (khul or mubara 'a), (3) delegated divorce initiated by the wife as
per a stipulation in the marriage contract (tawfid), and (4) judicial dissolution of marriage through
annulment (faskh) and separation (tafriq). JOHN L. ESPOSITO WITH NATANA J. DELONG-BAS, WOMEN tN
MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 28 (2d ed. 2001) (classifying divorce into given categories); MOHAMMAD
HASHIM KAMALI, ISLAMIC LAW IN MALAYSIA: ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS 74-85 (2000) (describing
talaq, khul, mubara'a, and tafriq); ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI, MARRIAGE ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF ISLAMIC
FAMILY LAW 36-41 (1993). The schools of law differ in the divorce and marriage rights they grant to
men and women. See generally Intisar Rabb, Procedures of Divorce and Remarriage in Classical Islamic
Law 2-7 (Jan. 12, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Rabb, Procedures of
Divorce and Remarriage].
Classical Islamic law provides the husband with the right to begin a divorce. THE QUR'AN
65:1-2 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 2003); see also LALEH BAKHTIAR, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAMIC LAW:
A COMPENDIUM OF THE MAJOR SCHOOLS 504-06 (1996); Rabb, Procedures of Divorce and Remarriage,
supra, at 3 & n.8 (citing MUHAMMAD JAWAD MAGHNIYYA, FIQH AL-IMAM JA'FAR AL-SADIQ 6:9-10
(2003) (Shi'i treatise on Islamic laws)). It also permits women two means of commencing a divorce.
First, in Sunni Islam, the husband could "delegate [his] right to his wife, to be used at will and at her
discretion." Rabb, Procedures of Divorce and Remarriage, supra, at 3 & n.10 (citing IBN QUDAMA,
MUWAFFAQ AL-DIN, MUGHNI, 10:381 ('Abd AlIgh b. Muhsin al-Turki ed., 1986) (Sunni Islamic law
compendium)). However, this "divorce-by-proxy" was not valid in classical Shi'i jurisprudence.
BAKHTIAR, supra, at 503. "Second, the woman could pursue a type of divorce in exchange for
consideration, in which the wife remits her dowry or a part thereof in exchange for marital dissolution."
Rabb, Procedures of Divorce and Remarriage, supra, at 3. This type of divorce is known as "khul'
(divorce in return for consideration) or mubdra'a (divorce by mutual agreement)." Id. at 3 n. II (citing
MAGHNIYYA, supra, at 6:17-25); see also BAKHTIAR, supra, at 544.
55. Abirafeh, supra note 33 (estimating that Afghanistan's population is roughly ninety percent
Sunni and ten percent Shi'i); Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1043, 1124 & n.362 (2002) (describing Hanafi jurisprudence as providing few
means by which a woman may seek to terminate her marriage); El Fadl, supra note 17, app. A at 13
(explaining that most Sunnis in Afghanistan follow the Hanafi school of law).
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order of separation). 6 The Hanafi grounds for judicial divorce are limited in
number and difficult to prove:
A court may dissolve a marriage only if: (1) the marriage is irregular;
(2) a person who has the option to dissolve the marriage exercises it;
(3) the parties are prohibited from marriage by fosterage; (4) the
marriage was contracted by non-Muslims who subsequently adopt
Islam (or vice versa); (5) a husband is unable to consummate the
marriage; or (6) he is missing.
7
This sixth ground is particularly important in Afghanistan, where decades of
conflict have resulted in the deaths and disappearance of many men. Indeed, the
Afghan Women's Bill of Rights includes a separate demand for "[r]eduction of
the time before women can remarry after their husbands have disappeared, and
mandatory government support of women during that time."58 While this
demand does not specifically mention Islam, it alludes to the fact that the
waiting periods imposed on women prior to their ability to remarry after
spousal disappearance may be based on understandings of Islamic or customary
law. Reports from the field indicate that due to the hostility of family members
and officials in the formal justice system59 or to their own lack of knowledge
about their rights under Islamic law,60 women may be prevented from accessing
judicial divorce even when their husbands have been missing for some time.
Permitting women access tofaskh and tafriq is a far more incremental step than
declaring that women have the same right to divorce as men. Yet, the
realization of even the relatively narrow Hanafi grounds for faskh and tafriq
would vastly improve women's access to divorce in Afghanistan.
Second, the call for Afghan women's right to marry and divorce under
Islam may also display a belief in the possibility of using principles of Islamic
law to promote reform more expansive than the mere implementation of
existing Hanafi provisions. Other schools of Islamic law permit women to
invoke grounds for a court-ordered divorce or annulment unavailable to them
under Hanafi law. For example, the Maliki school of Sunni Islam permits a
56. According to the doctrine of tafriq, a court or religious authority may terminate a marriage on
two grounds: (1) "at the request of one party based on certain grounds (such as marital discord, harm or
non-maintenance)," or (2) "without a request by either party out of regard for Islamic legal requirements
for the validity of a marriage, as in the case when a woman is not eligible for marriage because of some
legal impediment." Rabb, Procedures of Divorce and Remarriage, supra note 54, at 3 & n. 11 (citing
QUDAMA, supra note 54, at 11:237-38; MAGHNIYYA, supra note 54, at 6:37, 50-54; BAKHTIAR, supra
note 54, at 539-42).
57. ESPOSITO, supra note 54, at 35.
58. AFGHAN WOMEN'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43, art. 4.
59. See MPI REPORT, supra note 34, at 6 (describing how one woman's in-laws sought to prevent
her from divorcing her husband, who was missing for seven years, by warning the Department of
Women's Affairs not to intervene in her case). It is generally difficult for an Afghan woman to secure a
court-ordered annulment or divorce from her husband. When she does succeed, government officials
may thwart the order, particularly in cases of abuse. See WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK, supra note 39,
at 14-15.
60. MPI REPORT, supra note 34, at 10, 16.
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woman to seekfaskh and tafriq if: (1) her husband is cruel to her, (2) he refuses
or is not able to financially support her, (3) he has abandoned her, or (4) he
suffers from a serious medical condition that might harm her.6 1 Most
importantly, tafriq divorce under the Maliki school permits women to escape
marriages considered abusive by many standards. While the Hanafi school is
dominant among Sunnis in Afghanistan, the implementation of the Maliki
understanding of faskh and tafriq in Afghanistan may be justified under the
doctrines of takhayyur (selection of rules from different schools of law) and
62talfiq (synthesis of principles from different schools of law). The evocation of
takhayyur and talfiq in expanding the grounds by which women may seek
judicial annulment of their marriages or divorces is far from a radical concept.
Schools of Islamic law all recognize each others' authority, and significant
63borrowing between schools has taken place throughout the Muslim world,
including in Afghanistan itself with the promulgation of the Afghan Civil Code
64of 1977. Organizations such as Women Living Under Muslim Laws facilitate
such legal borrowing in countries implementing Islamic law by disseminating
61. ESPOSITO, supra note 54, at 35.
62. Abu-Odeh, supra note 55, at 1074 n. 119 (defining takhayyur and talflq by reference to WAEL
B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES 210 (1997)); Wael B. Hallaq, Juristic Authority v.
State Power: The Legal Crisis of Modern Islam, 19 J.L. & RELIGION 243, 257 (2003-2004); Aharon
Layish, The Contribution of the Modernists to the Secularization of Islamic Law, 14 MIDDLE E. STUD.
263, 263 (1978)).
63. Modem reformers of Islamic personal status laws, including divorce laws, have liberally drawn
upon both takhayyur and talfiq. Hallaq, supra note 62, at 257. One scholar has labeled takhayyur "one of
the modernists' favorite tools," and noted that through this doctrine "modem legislators in Sunni
countries have even resorted to Shi'i law in order to supplement their civil codes where Sunni law was
deemed insufficient for their needs." Id. Similarly, reformers have used talfliq to "combine[] ... several
elements pertaining to a single issue from more than one source." Id. For example, Morocco has
borrowed extensively from all four Sunni schools of thought as well as Shi'i schools in constructing the
Moroccan Family Code. ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK
178-81 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im ed., 2002). The Moroccan Family Code allows a man to rescind his
initiation of a divorce under certain circumstances, but only if he secures his wife's agreement and
confirmation by a judge and two witnesses. Moroccan Family Code, supra note 22, art. 124. While
Morocco primarily follows the Maliki school of Sunni Islam, the necessity of two witnesses was adopted
from Shi'i law and has origins in the Qur'an's text. Rabb, supra note 1, at 55. "This is an instance of
borrowing from another school that seems to have no Maliki basis but is explicit in the Qu'rdn." Id.
Similarly, although Islamic law in Malaysia is grounded upon the Shaf'i school of Sunni Islam, the
country passed in 1984 the Islamic Family Law Enactment for the Federal Territories, which provides
women the right to judicial divorce upon twelve conditions largely drawn from the Maliki school of law.
Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, No. 303, § 52 (1984) (Malay.); KAMALI, supra note
54, at 95-96; Memorandum on Reform of the Islamic Family Laws and the Administration of Justice in
the Syariah System in Malaysia, supra note 21. This borrowing was justified through a doctrine related
to takhayyur and talfiq, known in Bahasa Melayu as al-siyasa al-syariyya, which recognizes the right of
a state to enact legislation by choosing from among the four Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence for
the interpretation that best furthers the interest of the community on matters where there is no specific
text in the Qur'an or Sunna (as recorded in the hadith). Zainah Anwar, The Struggle for Women's Rights
Within the Religious Framework: The Experience of Sisters in Islam, in MODERN MALAYSIA IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 178, 183 (Colin Barlow
ed., 2001).
64. MPI REPORT, supra note 34, at 8.
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information about progressive developments in one country to activists in other
countries.
65
The 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan privileges Hanafi jurisprudence but
does not bar this legal borrowing. Article 130 provides, "[i]f there is no
provision in the Constitution or other laws about a case, the courts shall, in
pursuance of Hanafi jurisprudence, and, within the limits set by this
Constitution, rule in a way that attains justice in the best manner." 66 Hanafi
jurisprudence therefore serves to fill the gap when there is no statute or
constitutional provision on point, as established in Afghanistan's earlier
67constitution of 1964. Similarly, the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan requires
courts to apply the applicable Shi'i school of law in cases involving personal
law when no statute or constitutional provision is on point.68 The assignment of
Hanafi jurisprudence, or the relevant Shi'i school in cases concerning Afghan
Shi'i Muslims, to a gap-filling role does not prohibit, and actually creates room
for, the passage of "other laws"-that is, statutory laws-based on precepts or
lines of reasoning drawn from minority positions within Hanafi law or from
other schools. If granted their demand for full constitutional rights to marry and
divorce under Islam, Afghan women may forcefully argue for the reform of
Afghan divorce law to incorporate Maliki law's more expansive grounds for
women to seek a judicial order of annulment or divorce, as compared with the
more constrained options of Hanafi law or the applicable school of Shi'i Islam.
They may also advocate for the enforcement of these laws so that women may
actually exercise their rights in courts.
69
Third, the drafters of the Afghan Women's Bill of Rights may also have
called for women's rights to marry and divorce under Islam as a strategic move.
Afghanistan's past has witnessed moments in which radical change with
65. See Sunder, supra note 21, at 1435.
66. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004) art. 130 (emphasis added).
67. See CHRIS JOHNSON ET AL., AFGHANISTAN'S POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
26 (2003), available at http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/evaluations/afghandfid.pdf. The 1964
Constitution of Afghanistan provided that
[w]henever no provision exists in the Constitution or the laws for a case under consideration,
the court shall, by following the basic principles of the Hanafi jurisprudence of the shariaat of
Islam and within the provisions set forth in this constitution, render a decision that in their
opinion secures justice in the best possible way.
CONST. OF AFG. (1964), art. 102, available at http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/
constl964.html. But see CONST. OF AFG. (1923), art. 2 (as amended Jan. 28, 1925), available at
http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/constl923.html (providing that "the religion of Afghanistan
is the sacred religion of Islam" and "its official religious rite is the sublime Hanifite rite").
68. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 131.
69. Such a project is complicated by the fact that the co-existence of three legal systems in
Afghanistan-customary law, Islamic law, and statutory law codified in the Afghan Civil Code of
1977-has generated significant confusion as to the Afghan law on divorce that is currently in force. See
infra Subsection III.A.3. While some family law regulations of the civil code are actually based on the
Maliki school, in practice, judges consider "uncodified classical hanafi law... the main source of law,
superior to any statutory law." MPI REPORT, supra note 34, at 8. This judicial nullification may subvert
civil code reforms that seek to institute progressive formulations of Islamic law. See infra Subsection
III.A.3.
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respect to women's rights has prompted prolonged backlash. Dr. Sima Samar, a
female Deputy of the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga, was charged with
blasphemy and with "speaking out against [Islamic] law," and received death
threats due to her vocal participation on the council. 70 More recently, the
Afghan Supreme Court accused 2004 presidential candidate Abdul Latif
Pedram of blasphemy for questioning the practice of polygamy and suggesting
that women and men may have "an equal right to divorce." 71 It also tried to bar
him from the race. 72 Amnesty International reports that in reaction to this
denunciation, female vice-presidential candidate Nilobar Mubarez stated, "We
shouldn't provoke. When society is ready to ask the question that Pedram asks,
the women will ask it by themselves." 73 The fear of backlash has prompted
many to advocate a slow, incrementalist approach that works "within the
framework of Islam" as th6 "best and only way" to further women's rights in
Afghanistan.74 Rather than promoting dramatic change that will engender
backlash, the incremental achievement of even gender-differentiated rights to
marriage and divorce under Islam may significantly improve women's status.
Even in the face of intense obstacles, Afghan women have already engaged
in advocacy promoting women's rights by calling for reforms grounded in
Islam and Islamic law. Part II suggests ways in which the 2004 Constitution of
Afghanistan expands and constrains their efforts.
II. THE 2004 CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN-
CREATING SPACES FOR ISLAMIC FEMINISM
The inclusion of references to Islam in the 2004 Constitution of
Afghanistan is not a new or particularly surprising phenomenon given the
religion's central position in the constitutions created by the country's previous
governments: monarchic/secular, communist, Mujahideen, and Taliban.75
70. Carole J. Riphenburg, Gender Relations and Development in a Weak State: The Rebuilding of
Afghanistan, 22 CEN. ASIAN SURV. 187, 192 (2003).
71. Suhaila Musheni, Abdul LatifPedram: Intellectual Adds Controversy to Campaign, INST. FOR
WAR & PEACE REPORTING, Oct. 6, 2004, http://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=152889&apc state
=heniarr2004; WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK, supra note 39.
72. Isobel Coleman & Swanee Hunt, Afghanistan Should Make Room for Its Female Leaders,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 4, 2006 (referring to an unnamed presidential candidate who
"question[ed] whether polygamy is in keeping with the spirit of Islam").
73. WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK, supra note 39 (citing James Rupert, Eve of Afghanistan
Elections, NEWSDAY, Oct. 8, 2004). Amnesty found that Mubarez's statement "exemplifies the cautious
and precarious atmosphere under which the issue of advancing women's rights is currently debated." Id.
74. WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK, supra note 39.
75. See CONST. OF AFG. (1990), pmbl. para. 2, arts. 1, 2, available at http://www.afghan-web.con/
history/const/constl990.html (pledging adherence to the tenets of Islam, declaring Afghanistan an
Islamic Republic and Islam the state religion, and forbidding enactment of any law repugnant to Islam);
CONST. OF AFG. (1987), pmbl. para. 1, art. 2, available at http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/
const1 987.html (following "the tenets of the sacred religion of Islam" and providing that "no law shall
run counter to the principles of the sacred religion of Islam"); CONST. OF THE REPUBLICAN STATE OF
AFG. (1976), pmbl. para. 1, available at http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/constl976.html
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Rather than formally adopting Islamic law, the current constitution establishes
Afghanistan as an Islamic Republic (Article 1),76 recognizes Islam as the state
religion (Article 2),77 and prohibits the enactment of any law repugnant to the
injunctions of Islam and the values of the constitution (Article 3).78
The constitution also includes provisions explicitly and implicitly
promoting women's rights. For example, Article 53 promises state support for
"women without caretakers," those who lack financial support from a male
guardian or husband. 79 This provision has special significance for the many
women who have lost breadwinning husbands, fathers, or brothers in the
decades of conflict that have consumed the country and who lack access to
viable economic opportunities due to discrimination or to Afghanistan's dismal
economic situation. Article 33 is a gender-neutral provision that grants women
an equal right to political participation, stating that "[t]he citizens of
Afghanistan have the right to elect and be elected. The conditions of exercising
this right shall be stipulated by law." 80 Finally, Article 54 sets forth protections
for women as mothers:
Family is the fundamental pillar of the society and shall be protected
by the state. To attain the physical and spiritual health of the family,
especially of the child and mother, upbringing of children, as well as
the elimination of related traditions contrary to the principles of the
sacred religion of Islam, the state shall adopt necessary measures.
81
This provision may be used to improve the position of women who are treated
less favorably because of social taboos and customary practices that are
justified in the name of Islam, but not found within its contours. These
practices include forced marriage (which encompasses child marriage),
preference for sons, and dowry. 82 While these rights fall far short of the
(providing "trust in Almighty God" and pledging adherence "to the sacred religion of Islam"). While the
Taliban did not adopt a constitution, they "ran the country according to the unwritten principles of what
they believed to be Islamic morality and law," and granted Mullah Omar's statements "the force of law
with divine sanction." Shah, supra note 3, at 243.
76. "Afghanistan shall be an Islamic Republic, independent, unitary and indivisible state." CONST.
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 1.
77. "The sacred religion of Islam shall be the religion of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan." Id.
art. 2.
78. Id. art. 3. Article 149 also bars any amendment of constitutional provisions dealing with the
"adherence to the tenets of the Holy religion of Islam as well as Islamic Republicanism." Id. art. 149.
79. Article 53 provides, "The state shall guarantee the rights of retirees, and shall render necessary
aid to the elderly, women without caretakers, disabled and handicapped as well as poor needy orphans in
accordance with the provisions of the law." Id. art. 53.
80. However, Article 72(2) limits Article 33 by making higher education a requirement for
membership in the National Assembly. Id. arts. 33, 72(2). This provision has a disparate impact on
women because most will not have the necessary higher education to run for office. The framers of the
constitution adopted this provision despite their awareness of the low literacy rate of women across
Afghanistan.
81. Id. art. 54.
82. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HARMFUL
TRADITIONAL PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HEALTH OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN, FACT SHEET NO. 23,
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs23.htm. Child marriage is considered a type of
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expansive vision for Afghan women set forth in the Afghan Women's Bill of
Rights, advocates operating within secular and Islamic idioms may call upon
these provisions to press for legislation or funding that will help enable women
to exercise their rights in these areas.
Most importantly, women's rights advocates, domestic and international,
fought hard for Article 22, the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan's equality
provision, which declares that "[a]ny kind of discrimination and distinction
between citizens of Afghanistan shall be forbidden. The citizens of
Afghanistan, man and woman, have equal rights and duties before the law."
83
Article 149 of the constitution, which outlines the scope of permissible
constitutional amendments, protects the equality provision by stating that any
amendment to the "fundamental rights of the people shall be permitted only to
improve them."'84 The constitution itself does not define "discrimination" or
"distinction." Other constitutional provisions nevertheless suggest how the
judiciary may interpret these terms in the context of Article 22. Of particular
importance is Article 7, which provides that "The United Nations Charter,
inter-state agreements, as well as international treaties to which Afghanistan
has joined, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall be
respected., 85 By requiring the government to comply with the international
treaties to which Afghanistan is a party, this provision opens the door to
arguments that the judiciary should interpret the terms "discrimination" and
"distinction" to carry the meanings they hold, contested as these meanings may
be, in international human rights treaties to which Afghanistan is a party. More
generally, this provision empowers women's rights advocates to urge the
government to comply with its obligations under treaties that safeguard
women's rights, including CEDAW, which the country ratified without any
reservation, 86 and the International Covenant for Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).87
This explicit tie between the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan and the
international human rights instruments ratified by the country widens the
playing field for both secular and Islamic calls for women's rights. For
forced marriage because underage girls lack the legal capacity to consent to marriage. WOMEN STILL
UNDER ATTACK, supra note 39, at 15.
83. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 22.
84. Id. art. 149.
85. Id. art. 7.
86. Afghanistan's ratification of CEDAW in March 2003 without reservation is all the more
astonishing given the predominance of reservations by orhwe Muslim majority countries to CEDAW on
religious grounds. Jacinto, supra note 41, at 9 (noting fact of ratification); Shah, supra note 3, at 255
(discussing implications of Afghanistan's ratification of CEDAW without reservation). It also has
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1456 (1989);
Jacinto, supra note 41, at 9.
87. CEDAW, supra note 52; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
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example, secular advocates like RAWA may call on parliament to pass
legislation expanding a woman's right to divorce under the government's
Article 7 obligation to implement Afghanistan's international commitment to
CEDAW. Similarly, advocates grounding their activism in Islam may urge the
parliament or judges to expand women's rights to divorce on the basis that
Article 7 supports the replacement of current conceptions of Islamic law in
Afghanistan regarding women's access to divorce with more progressive
formulations, thereby promoting both the compatibility of laws with Islamic
"beliefs and provisions" (Article 3) and Afghanistan's implementation of its
international obligations. Article 7 may, therefore, assist Islamic feminists in
their efforts to supplant Islamic law as conceived (or misconceived) by hardline
political Islamists with their own interpretations. For example, given the
existence of two different conceptions of the grounds for women to seek
judicial annulment and divorce in Hanafi and Maliki jurisprudence---one that is
closer to CEDAW's promise to afford women and men the same rights to
divorce and one that is farther away-Article 7 may help Islamic feminists pass
laws and influence judicial interpretation to supplant the latter understanding
with the former, in the name of promoting Afghanistan's constitutionally
required compliance with its international obligations.
Not only does the constitution provide language and provisions for Islamic
feminists to use in their advocacy for legal reform, the 2004 Constitution of
Afghanistan also reserves for women twenty-five percent of the seats in the
Wolesi Jirga, the lower house of the national legislature, and requires the
president to appoint women to seventeen percent of the positions in the
Meshrano Jirga, the upper house. 88 Feminist advocates may seek to run for
office themselves or promote other women who share their goal of enacting
legislative reform to promote women's rights. Once in power, female
parliamentarians may seek to pass legislation advancing women's rights and
block the passage of detrimental laws or constitutional amendments. The latter
tactic may be necessary, for example, in the event that the Taliban or other
political Islamists regain control of Afghanistan and seek to amend
constitutional provisions advancing women's rights and status, such as those
providing state support for "women without caretakers" and protecting the
health of mothers. The constitution's equality provision is arguably guarded by
Article 149's requirement that provisions promoting the "fundamental rights of
the people" may be amended "only to improve them." With the exception of
Article 3, however, other constitutional provisions may be amended "with due
respect to new experiences and requirements of the time," leaving vulnerable
constitutional safeguards for women that fall short of setting forth fundamental
88. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), arts. 83-84; see also KANDIYOTI, supra note
3 (discussing constitutional reservation of seats for women in both houses of the Afghanistan national
legislature).
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rights.89 In either circumstance, an amendment "shall become effective with the
proposal of the President and approval of the majority of National Assembly
members." 90 That constitutional amendments may be effected through a simple
majority vote further underscores the potential impact of reserving seats for
women in the national legislature on the realization of women's rights through
legal reform. Nevertheless, even the institution of gender-based quotas in the
national legislature cannot be lauded as a simple success. There is an expansive
literature questioning the effect of reservations for women in national
government on the passage of legislation, policy development and
implementation, government legitimacy, and the participation of women in
governance.9' As the literature suggests, the mere presence of women in the
Afghan Parliament may not lead to a simple or direct increase in legislative
reform promoting women's rights. Not all women will seek to pass such
legislation or to block legislation or constitutional amendments harming
women's rights, particularly in light of ethnic and religious divisions between
women and the factionalism rampant in Afghan politics. 92 The Los Angeles
Times recently reported that "[e]ven among the 68 women in [Afghanistan's]
parliament, U.S. and United Nations officials estimate that half have militia
ties, and can be counted on to keep quiet and vote as they are told., 93 Of
course, there are others, like Zahera Sharif, a female member of parliament
(MP) elected in 2005, who told the Los Angeles Times that she ran for office
out of a desire to help women in her district by "'taking all the women with
[her]' on her way forward. 94 Without a critical mass of women, however, even
89. Article 149 prohibits the amendment of Article 3's requirement that "[n]o law shall contravene
the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam .... CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG.
(2004), arts. 3, 149.
90. Id. art. 149.
91. See supra note 31.
92. Deniz Kandiyoti counsels that "[g]iven the factious nature of politics in Afghanistan, there is
little a priori ground for making simplistic assumptions about women's primary commitment to
subscribing to a common agenda." KANDIYOTI, supra note 3, at 22. The proceedings of the
Constitutional Loya Jirga, where 100 of the 502 delegates were women, provide a case in point.
LAURYN OATES & ISABELL SOLON HELAL, AT THE CROSS-ROADS OF CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY:
WOMEN AND AFGHANISTAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL LOYA JIRGA 26 (2004). There, "[a] majority of the
female delegates ... were affiliated with violent, conservative factions and voted in line with their
demands, dividing women in accordance with ethnic, religious and factional identities, rather than under
their shared identity as women." Id. at 28. Some women affiliated with factions went so far as to
intimidate other female delegates. Id. In this context, women who sought to promote the inclusion of
constitutional protections for women's rights were left to "work[] individually, isolated from each other
and restricted in the impact they could make." Id. While the experience of the Constitutional Loya Jirga
is not determinative of future dynamics in the Afghan Parliament, it does suggest that promoting
women's rights in the national legislature may remain challenging, even after the institution of quotas
for female representation.
93. Alissa J. Rubin, Living Symbols of Reform in Afghanistan: Female Lawmakers Work for, and
Embody Change, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2006, at Al.
94. Id.
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those who seek to advocate for women's rights may face difficulty promoting
minority positions.
95
In 2005, Afghanistan's new parliament was formed with the country's first
direct election, in which female MPs exceeded the seats set aside for women in
the Wolesi Jirga.96 At least some of these women, like Sharif, will seek to use
their position to promote women's rights. In theory, women (and men) in the
Afghan Parliament who endeavor to improve the situation of Afghan women
may point to constitutional provisions not just to secure the passage and
implementation of specific pieces of legislation to promote women's rights, but
also to secure needed funding and resources to enable women to exercise these
rights on the ground.
97
Despite these positive signs, the institution of judicial review by the 2004
Constitution of Afghanistan serves as a check on the potential impact of women
as legislators in the new Afghanistan. As discussed, Article 3 mandates that "no
law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam."
98
Article 121 of the constitution grants the Supreme Court the power of judicial
review to strike legislation for incompatibility with this provision.99 The 2004
Constitution of Afghanistan is conspicuously silent on what constitutes "tenets"
or "provisions of the holy religion of Islam." This omission is particularly
problematic in light of the wide-ranging and often contradictory discourse on
Islamic interpretation and the ever-present threat of a conservative Islamist
upsurge led by remnants of the Taliban power structure.1
0 0
95. Jane Mansbridge has argued that representatives of subordinate groups need the support of "a
critical mass to become willing to enunciate minority positions" and "to convince others-particularly
members of dominant groups-that the perspectives or insights they are advancing are widely shared,
genuinely felt and deeply held within their group." Mansbridge, supra note 31, at 24.
96. LAURYN OATES, WOMANKIND WORLDWIDE, TAKING STOCK UPDATE: AFGHAN WOMEN
AND GIRLS FIVE YEARS ON 18 (2006), http://www.womankind.org.uk/upload/
TakingStock_5 YearsOnOct2006_english.pdf [hereinafter AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS FIVE
YEARS ON].
97. The potential of electoral reservations for women in national government to improve conditions
for Afghan women extends beyond the possibility that female MPs will vote on constitutional
amendments, legislation, or appropriations with this goal in mind. They may also use their positions to
advocate for women on the ground. For example, Zahera Sharif has sought to improve girls' education
in her district both by personally persuading educated women to work as teachers for girls and by
convincing families to permit their daughters to attend school. Rubin, supra note 93. In the future, both
female MPs like Sharif and male MPs who support women's rights may seek to enhance these on the
ground efforts with calls for legislative measures like increased funding for girls' education in
parliament.
98. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 3.
99. Article 121 of the constitution provides, "At the request of the Government, or courts, the
Supreme Court shall review the laws, legislative decrees, international treaties as well as international
covenants for their compliance with the Constitution and their interpretation in accordance with the
law." Id. art. 121.
100. Taliban commanders continue to instigate violence in Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan.
INT'L CRISIS GROUP, ASIA REPORT 123, COUNTERING AFGHANISTAN'S INSURGENCY: NO QUICK FIXES
8-13 (2006), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south-asia/
123 counteringafghanistans insurgency.pdf. One local security official estimated that approximately
one in five insurgents identify as Taliban. Id. at 8.
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While the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan offers important tools for
Islamic feminists to use in their advocacy for women's rights, it presents
potential checks, in the form of vague provisions and the institution of judicial
review, on their capacity to enact change. The constitution is therefore a limited
step in the right direction: It expands Afghan women's ability to advocate for
their rights from the extremely narrow spaces available in immediately
preceding regimes even as it limits the breadth of that expansion. Moving
beyond a textual analysis of the constitution itself, however, is critically
necessary to achieve a better understanding of the capability of Islamic feminist
advocacy to secure improvements not only in the formal law, but in women's
lives. An examination of the legal and extra-legal constraints on their efforts
provides a more nuanced and contextualized understanding of Islamic
feminism's capacity to advance women's rights and status in present-day
Afghanistan.
III. CONSTRAINTS ON ISLAMIC FEMINISM IN AFGHANISTAN
An early reminder that serious obstacles confront Islamic feminist
advocacy was the failure of President Karzai and members of the constitutional
drafting commission to follow through on their promise to include the demands
of the Afghan Women 's Bill of Rights in the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan.
Constraints both inside and outside of the law threaten the potential of Islamic
feminism to improve women's opportunities in Afghanistan. These constraints
bolster the possibility that judicial review by unelected jurists will be used to
curb advances for women won by Islamic feminists in the Afghan Parliament
even when undertaken within the framework of Islam. They also threaten to
undermine the impact of successful change of the formal law-either through
legislative means or influence on judicial interpretation-on women's lives.
Three categories of constraints-structural deficiencies in the Afghan judiciary,
the pervasive lack of security in Afghanistan, and women's low socio-
economic status-merit exploration for their potential to restrict the
advancement of women's rights through Islamic legal reform. This Part briefly
addresses each of these obstacles in turn.
A. Structural Deficiencies of the Judiciary
Key characteristics of Afghanistan's judicial system may confine the
efforts and impact of those who seek to advance women's rights through
reform of Islamic law. Three main structural deficiencies include the
politicization and gender-bias of the judiciary, the weakness of the formal legal
system, and the lack of clarity surrounding applicable law.
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1. Politicization and Gender-Bias of the Judiciary
Mawlavi Fazl Hadi Shinwari, Afghanistan's first Chief Justice under the
current internationally-backed regime of Hamid Karzai, started the country's
Supreme Court off on a noticeably reactionary and politicized path. Only ten
days after the close of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, the new Supreme Court
made a troubling and controversial decision when it declared as "un-Islamic"
the first broadcast of a female vocalist on Afghan state television in twelve
years. 10' The Supreme Court denounced the performance despite the fact that
pop star Salma covered her hair with a headscarf while singing.'0 2 While
Article 121 of the Constitution of Afghanistan permits the Supreme Court to
engage in the review and interpretation of laws, legislative decrees, and
international treaties "[a]t the request of the Government or courts,' 103 the
Court made this decision without any case before it and based on no existing
law or referral of the issue by the government. The Supreme Court's Deputy
Chief Justice Fazl Ahmad Manawi offered an explanation for the decision that
alludes to the Court's bias: "We are opposed to women singing and dancing as
a whole .. . . [A]nd it has to be stopped.',
10 4
With this decision, the new Supreme Court of Afghanistan set a precedent
for exceeding the constitutional limitations on its own power. That it did so is
no surprise in light of the leadership of the Court and the institutional path on
which it has embarked. Chief Justice Shinwari was initially appointed by
former President Burhanuddin Rabbani in 2001, and then reappointed by
current President Hamid Karzai.10 5 Shinwari has introduced or exacerbated
numerous institutional problems in the Afghan judiciary. The position of Chief
Justice is particularly powerful: Besides heading the Supreme Court, he
oversees the exercise of the Supreme Court's authority to appoint lower court
judges with the approval of the President.'0 6 A political Islamist, former leader
of a madrasa (religious school) in Peshawar, and an ally of the Saudi-backed
101. J. Alexander Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan, in 19 CENTER ON
DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE RULE OF LAW 1, 1 (2004), available at http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/20714/ReestablishingtheJudiciary_inAfghanistan.pdf.
102. Afghan TV U-Turn on Women Singers, BBC NEWS, Jan. 16, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/southasia/3402283.stm.
103. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 121.
104. Woman Singer Angers Afghan Judges, BBC NEWS, Jan. 14, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/southasia/3396283.stm. Shinwari has also attempted to ban "'anti-Islamic' news organizations" for
other supposed offenses, including featuring women news anchors. Jacinto, supra note 41, at 11 n.2.
President Karzai has failed to support the media with any consistent policy. Id. News organizations have
instead sought protection in Article 34 of the Constitution, which provides that "[fireedom of expression
shall be inviolable," and that "[e]very Afghan shall have the right to express thoughts through speech,
writing, illustrations as well as other means in accordance with provisions of this Constitution." CONST.
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 34.
105. Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, U.S. INST. FOR PEACE SPECIAL REP. 117, at 7
(2004).
106. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 132.
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Islamist militia leader Abdur Rasool Sayyaf,10 7 Shinwari represents one of the
most reactionary political figures in Afghanistan on the issue of women's
rights. He has drawn sharp critiques from domestic and international human
rights advocates for his declaration that "equality of sexes" should not be a part
of Afghanistan's constitution.' ° 8 To further his aims, Chief Justice Shinwari
oversaw the appointment of likeminded conservatives to all levels of the
judiciary. 109 Most of these appointees lack professional judicial experience and
secular legal training, and have been trained only in classical Islamic law, if at
all.' 10 Both the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice have drawn criticism
for their dominance by religious conservatives and political Islamists without
education in secular law.111 Shinwari also created the Religious Edict Council
in the Supreme Court, an institution of dubious constitutionality, to enforce
Article 3,112 and by 2003, oversaw appointment of 137 judges to the Supreme
Court, which is to consist of only nine members under the current
constitution. 113
Under Shinwari's leadership, the Supreme Court sided consistently with
conservatives, dashing the hopes of reformers and threatening the rights of
women. In the process, it also overstepped its own constitutional boundaries
and Afghan law. The Supreme Court sought to ban co-education not through a
valid exercise of its Article 121 power to conduct judicial review or issue
advisory opinions responsive to government requests, but by labeling it "un-
Islamic."1 14 It similarly flouted Afghan civil law by upholding child
107. Thier, supra note 101, at 7, 10.
108. Preeta D. Bansal & Felice D. Gaer, Silenced Again in Kabul, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2003, at
A23.
109. Thier, supra note 9.
110. J. Alexander Thier, Editorial, The Crescent and the Gavel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, § 4, at
13. Note that "[t]he majority of judges lack legal training in the secular law and in the sharia." U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Report of Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, Integration of the Human Rights of Women and a Gender Perspective: Violence
Against Women, 49, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61/Add.5 (Feb. 15, 2006) (prepared by Yakin Erturk)
[hereinafter UN Special Rapporteur Report on Afghanistan].
111. Mir Hermatullah Sadat, The Implementation of Constitutional Human Rights in Afghanistan,
II HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2004, at 48, 71. One political analyst characterized the Supreme Court as
composed of "fundamentalists" in an interview with the Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Inst. for
War and Peace Reporting, Crisis in Supreme Court, Feb. 4, 2005, http://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o
=239100&apc state=heniarr200502. Drumbl observed that "among those members of the Afghanistan
Supreme Court [in 2004] whose educational qualifications are publicly known there is not a single
individual with a secular law degree." Drumbl, supra note 11, at 366.
112. Sadat, supra note 11l, at 50; Thier, supra note 9.
113. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 117 (establishing a Supreme Court of
nine justices, each serving staggered terms of no longer than ten years); AMNESTY INT'L,
AFGHANISTAN: RE-ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW 12 (2003), http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/
ASA I0212003ENGLISH/SFile/ASAl 102103.pdf (reporting that in 2003, 137 judges had been
appointed to the Supreme Court). At the time of Amnesty International's report, the then-in-force 1964
Constitution of Afghanistan alsopermitted a Supreme Court of only nine justices. 1964 AFGHAN CONST.
art. 105, available at http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/constl 964.html. It is unclear if the extra
128 justices on the Supreme Court have been dismissed since the ratification of the 2004 Constitution.
114. Thier, supra note 101, at 7 n.10.
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marriages," 5 despite the requirement that girls may not be legally married
before the age of fifteen.' 16 The politicization and corruption of the judiciary
under Shinwari's leadership, and its domination by religious conservatives,
have prompted observers to call upon President Karzai to dismiss the entire
Supreme Court and reappoint "respected and experienced Afghan jurists"
representing a greater diversity of views-a power granted to Karzai by the
2004 Constitution, but which he has chosen not to exercise.
17
The bias of the post-Taliban Supreme Court against women's rights
reflects not only the recent appointment of conservatives like Shinwari, but
long-standing, structural problems. Afghanistan notably lacks a strong recent
history of female judging. Shortly after coming to power, the Taliban almost
completely banned women from working outside the home and dismissed all
female judges. 18 While women judges do serve in Afghanistan's lower
courts1 9 and women currently head both the Family and Juvenile Courts,
120
statistics on women on the Afghan bench paint a dismal picture. According to
an estimate provided by the Afghan Women Judges Association, women
constitute a mere three and a half percent of the judiciary. 12 1 Female judges are
infrequently found outside of Kabul 22 and are largely "confined to lower
levels."' 23 Not a single woman has secured a position at the judiciary's highest
level, the Scholar Council of the Supreme Court. 124 A 2003 Amnesty
International report revealed that the biases of many male judges pose a
, • 125
primary obstacle to increasing women's representation on the bench. 1 In these
115. Coleman & Hunt, supra note 72, at 9 (reporting that the Supreme Court "upheld the marriage
of a 9-year-old girl"); UN Special Rapporteur Report on Afghanistan, supra note 110, 26 (reporting
that Chief Justice Shinwari "condemn[ed] child marriage as being against Islam and Afghan laws and
tradition," while nevertheless refusing to rule on the validity of an eight-year-old girl's marriage until
she reached the age of fifteen). '
116. UN Special Rapporteur Report on Afghanistan, supra note 110, 39.
117. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 64, para. 13; AMNESTY INT'L, supra
note 113, at 12-13; Thier, supra note 9.
118. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 10, § 5; Katherine McCullough, Out with the Old and In
with the New: The Long Struggle for Judicial Reform in Afghanistan, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 821,
824 (2006).
119. UNIFEM, Advocating for Women's Participation in Afghanistan's Supreme Court,
http://www.unifem.org/genderissues/voices-from-the field/story.php?StorylD=425 (last visited Nov.
1,2006).
120. Id. While the 1976 Afghan Code of Civil Procedure sets forth that every district in
Afghanistan shall have a specific family court, only one family court in Kabul has been established. MPI
REPORT, supra note 34, at 5.
121. In April 2006, UNIFEM reported, "[t]he Afghan Women Judges Association... estimates
that of roughly 2,000 sitting judges in Afghanistan, between 65 and 70 are female," figures that
correspond to approximately 3.5% of the judiciary. UNIFEM, supra note 119. While this percentage is a
slight increase from Amnesty International's 2003 report that women composed 1.3% of the judiciary, it
remains unimpressive. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 113.
122. AMNESTY INT'L, AFGHANISTAN: WOMEN FAILED BY PROGRESS IN AFGHANISTAN (2004),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA110152004ENGLISH/$File/ASAI 101504.pdf.
123. UNIFEM, supra note 119.
124. Id.
125. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 113, at 12-16.
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interviews, some judges "expressed a lack of concern for, and even resistance
to, the greater inclusion of women in the judiciary;" others commented that
"more women in the judiciary... would only be appropriate.., in the family
and juvenile courts;" and "many senior judges expressed outright opposition to
increasing the number of women judges."'' 26 Chief Justice Shinwari indicated
that his clear priority was to address male unemployment before "turn[ing] our
attention to women."1 27 Women's exclusion from Islamic education and
positions of religious authority contributes to such bias. According to the
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), an Amnesty
International report found that:
[A] main reason for women's exclusion from the Supreme Court lay in
a popular belief among legislators that women were not as well trained
in religious matters as men. Many male judges are often former or
practicing religious leaders, and since women are not allowed to
participate in Islam as mullahs or religious authorities, they are often
considered less qualified as judges. 128
A 2004 Amnesty International report also indicates that even when women
achieve positions on the bench, they are often relegated to the work of judicial
clerks rather than the task of judging cases. 129 The marginalization of women in
the judiciary undermines the possibility that female judges who interpret
Islamic and Afghan law to grant women more expansive rights than those
envisioned by many of their male counterparts will exercise significant
influence.
While many male judges are biased against women, it is important to note
that such bias varies between individual judges and throughout the country, as
does its force as a constraint on the abilities of Islamic feminists to institute
positive change. For example, an Appeals Court Judge in Kandahar, the former
seat of Taliban power, stated in 2004: "Women are the property of men from
the waist down." 130 In contrast, Deputy Chief Justice Manawi indicated in an
interview with Amnesty International that "forced marriage is a crime in
statutory and Shariah law."''31 Gender bias amongst the judiciary and other law
enforcement officials may also vary along regional lines. Amnesty International
reports that, based on its "limited research," officials in "the northern, western,
and central parts of Afghanistan" hold broader understandings of women's
rights than those in the southern and eastern parts of the country. 132 Human
126. Id. at 14-15.
127. Id. at 15.
128. UNIFEM, supra note 119.
129. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 122, at 1.
130. WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK, supra note 39, at 25.
131. Id. at 26.
132. Id.
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Rights Watch has similarly documented that the enforcement of rights is
extremely diverse across the country.
1 3 3
There may be reason for hope that the politicization and gender-bias of the
Afghan judiciary will change in the future. President Karzai's May 2006
Supreme Court nominations were the first to be subject to parliament's scrutiny
since the institution of the new administration. 134 While parliament overlooked
Karzai's failure to propose a single woman for the Supreme Court,' 35 it at least
firmly rejected his nomination of Mawlavi Fazl Hadi Shinwari for a renewed
tenure as Chief Justice. Instead, parliament approved the President's second
nominee, Abdul Salam Hazimi, in July 2006.136 Hazimi has distinguished
credentials amongst Islamic jurists as a graduate of Al-Azhar University in
Egypt, "the Sunni Muslim world's highest seat of learning."' 137 Unlike his
predecessor, however, he has also studied in the United States' 38 and is
considered a "moderate technocrat."'1 39 Moreover, Hazimi and the other recent
appointments to the Supreme Court have no known ties to political Islamists.
Observers may hope that the appointment of far more moderate jurists to the
Supreme Court will mitigate the politicization and gender-bias of the judiciary
under Shinwari and leave more room for feminists and others who advocate for
the appointment to the bench of more women and judges-whether male or
female-who are sympathetic towards women's rights.
2. Multiple Legal Regimes and the Limited Reach of Formal Legal Rules
While the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan introduced tools for Islamic
feminists to use in advocacy to improve women's formal rights through
legislative change at the national level, this strategy for improving women's
status is inherently limited by the relatively weak hold of formal, national legal
institutions in Afghanistan. Commentators have long noted that Afghanistan's
legal system is not uniform. 140 Instead, the country features three competing
133. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "KILLING YOU IS A VERY EASY THING FOR Us": HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES IN SOUTHEAST AFGHANISTAN 75 (2003), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2003/
afghanistan0703/ (describing variation in women's security and mobility in different provinces). Rights
violations occur more often in Kandahar, Jalalabad, and more rural areas than in Kabul. Id.
134. Coleman & Hunt, supra note 72, at 9.
135. Id.
136. Joe Shaulis, Afghan Parliament Approves Second Karzai Nominee for Chief Justice, JURIST,
July 31, 2006, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/07/afghan-parliament-approves-
second.php.
137. Rahim Faiez, Afghan Lawmakers Approve Chief Justice, S.F. CHRON., July 31, 2006,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2006/07/3 1/international/
i 043071D90.DTL.
138. Id.
139. Amin Tarzi, Afghanistan. New Supreme Court Could Mark Genuine Departure, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Aug. 11, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/08/9d8df381 -b4fe-442f-
a02b-e78c8ad3e850.html.
140. KANDIYOTI, supra note 3, at 24.
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legal institutions-the customary legal system, Islamic law, and state legal
codes-that have varied in strength and prevalence across time and geographic
region.14 1 While central authorities have attempted to institute statutory and
Islamic laws through formal judicial institutions throughout Afghanistan's
history, current accounts describe the formal justice system as relatively weak
even in urban centers where the central government is strongest. 142 In the rural
areas that hold approximately seventy-five percent of the population and where
functioning courts, police, and other formal legal institutions are virtually
nonexistent, the formal judicial system is seen as remote, elitist, illegitimate,
bankrupt, costly, and slow. 14 3 Because of this, Islamic feminist advocacy for
national legislation and reform of the composition and interpretive
methodology of the national judiciary may have a limited ability to concretely
improve women's lives. As one scholar has noted, "Afghanistan's official law,
i.e., the formal legal system established under the provisions of a constitution,
does not represent the de facto norms that govern the lives of the majority of
the population. 144
In the face of recent decades of conflict and the collapse of the formal legal
system, the informal system has further solidified its position in Afghanistan.1
45
The informal system is grounded in Afghan customary law, distinguishable
from both Islamic and statutory law as "the means by which local communities
resolve disputes in the absence of (or in opposition to) state or religious
authority." 146 Reports estimate that Afghans resolve the vast majority of civil
141. The development of parallel formal and informal judicial systems first originated in the 1880s
when Mir Abdur Rahman sought to create a "coherent, defined legal system" based on the Hanaf
school of Islamic jurisprudence as part of his state-building campaign. THOMAS BARFIELD, NEAMAT
NOJUMI, & J. ALEXANDER THIER, THE CLASH OF Two GOODS: STATE AND NON-STATE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN 18 (2006), available at http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/projects/
clashtwogoods.pdf [hereinafter CLASH OF Two GOODS].
142. Id. at 20. Martin Lau, a scholar of Afghan law, notes that "[w]ithout exception every single
survey of Afghanistan's legal system... observed, and frequently lamented, the fact that Afghanistan's
statutory laws and regulations existed, for all practical purposes, on paper only." MARTIN LAU, INT'L
COMM'N OF JURISTS, AFGHANISTAN'S LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS COMPATIBILITY WITH INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 7 (2003).
143. CLASH OF Two GOODS, supra note 141, at 2.
144. LAU, supra note 142.
145. Almost three decades of disorder, civil war, and invasion in Afghanistan have thrown the
already precarious balance between customary law, Islamic law and statutory law into "complete
disarray." CLASH OF Two GOODS, supra note 141, at 2.
146. Id. at 6. "Customary law.., is based on a common cultural and ethical code that generates
binding rules on its members. Communities use this code to resolve disputes, evaluate actions for praise
or blame, and impose sanctions against violators of local accepted norms." Id. A source of significant
confusion is the relationship between Islamic and customary law. The two are not one and the same,
despite the evocation of Islam by authorities in customary law systems. In Afghanistan, customary law
has been "highly localized" and administered by respected community members or leaders who lack any
formal training. Id. at 12-13. In contrast, Islamic law has been considered "universally applicable to all
times and places," its precepts articulated and administered by professional qadis (judges) trained in
classical Hanafi law. Id. at 12. Islamic religious authorities in Afghanistan have looked down on
customary law practices and have attempted to supplant them with Islamic interpretations requiring
religious authorities' involvement in dispute resolution. Id.
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and criminal disputes in informal customary-law institutions, which are
considered more rapid and cost-effective than formal institutions. 47 While
customary legal systems in Afghanistan vary widely by geographic region and
along ethnic and religious lines, 48 they share the goal of eschewing the
punishment of perpetrators for the restoration of harmony through equitable
settlements reached by a jirga or shura (council) with the assistance of
respected community members or elders as "fact finders and decision-
makers."' 149 The Pashtunwali code of Afghanistan's dominant Pashtun ethnic
group prevails in the southern and eastern region of the country. 150 It propounds
a restorative approach to conflicts, providing "compensation for the wrong
done and social reconciliation" through the transfer of money, goods, services,
animals, or women from the family of the wrong-doer to the family of the
abused. 151 For example, the customary law of the Ahmed Zai Pashtun tribe
prescribes, as a typical remedy for the crime of "intentional murder without
abuse or torture," the forced marriage of two virgin girls from the perpetrator's
family to a relative of the victim. In this way, customary law actually harms
women. While not all customary law systems promote the exchange of women
as a restorative measure, 153 the co-existence of formal and informal legal
institutions and the dominance of unreformed customary forms of dispute
resolution threaten to limit the potential of national legislation or judicial
reforms to impact women's daily lives.
Thus, even if the formal Afghan judiciary was not politicized or dominated
by religiously conservative and gender-biased male judges, the weak reach of
147. UN Special Rapporteur Report on Afghanistan, supra note 110, 53 (noting that 80% of
disputes are resolved informally); CLASH OF Two GOODS, supra note 141, at 3 (80-90%); Coleman &
Hunt, supra note 72 (85%). Most Afghans would not consider using a government court for dispute
resolution. THOMAS BARFIELD, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE
FORMAL LEGAL SYSTEM IN CONTEMPORARY NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN 1 (Draft Apr. 21, 2006),
available at http://www.usip.org/rnleoflaw/projects/barfield-report.pdf ("The courts and judges are
widely disliked and avoided by most residents as a way to resolve disputes. People complain that the
courts are too slow, expensive, and corrupt."). One survey found that "only 16% of Afghans would go to
a government court to resolve their disputes." CLASH OF Two GOODS, supra note 141, at 3 n.4 (citing
ASIA FOUND., AFGHANISTAN N 2006: A SURVEY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE (2006)).
148. Afghanistan is characterized by a high degree of ethnic diversity. It is home to Pashtuns (40-
45% of the population), Tajiks (30%), Hazara (15%), Uzbek (8%), and Turkmen (3%). CLASH OF Two
GOODS, supra note 141, at 5. Many of these larger ethnic groups also feature considerable internal
diversity. Id. Both between and within ethnic groups, there is a considerable range in the formality and
systemization of dispute resolution systems. Id.
149. Id. at 6-7. For a detailed account of the various customary legal institutions in Afghanistan, see
INT'L LEGAL FOUND., THE CUSTOMARY LAWS OF AFGHANISTAN (2004), available at
http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/projects/ilf-customarylaw afghanistan.pdf.
150. CLASH OF Two GOODS, supra note 141, at 7. The Pashtunwali is "an oral tradition that
consists of general principles and practices (tsali) that are applied to specific cases." Id.
151. Id. at 8; Drumbl, supra note 11, at 384.
152. Drumbl, supra note 11, at 384.
153. In a 2006 study of customary legal institutions in Northern Afghanistan, Thomas Barfield
noted that there was "universal condemnation of bad (exchange of women in marriage as
compensation)" and "a strong move to condemn and prohibit all forms of forced marriage as in violation
of [Islamic] law and hence un-Islamic." BARFIELD, supra note 147, at 11.
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the formal system would promise to mitigate the impact of national advocacy
grounded in religious discourse. In other words, reform of Islamic law will not
automatically translate into reform of localized customary law or its
implementation, without specific advocacy aimed at transforming customary
legal institutions themselves. The latter project will not be easy in light of the
fact that Afghan women's exclusion from the formal judicial system is
surpassed only by their exclusion from positions of authority within informal
customary law institutions that largely shun women's participation.
54
Nevertheless, some Islamic feminists have specifically targeted the
existence of multiple legal regimes and the limited reach of formal legal rules
as sites for advocacy, arguing for the differentiation of patriarchal customary
law norms from Islamic law. At a conference called the Islamic Awareness
Program, women in Afghanistan invited male religious scholars to reconsider
their understanding of the rights afforded to women under Islam.'55 Indeed,
legal hybridity does not itself restrict women's ability to advocate for their
rights through the interpretation of Islamic law. The co-existence of multiple
legal regimes and the limited reach of formal law may create the opportunity
for Islamic feminists to proffer their own interpretations by preventing the
dominance of any single norm. Within the context of normative competition,
women may find spaces to articulate and advance progressive understandings
of Islamic law that contest classical formulations or customary laws that curtail
women's rights. This project lies at the heart of Islamic feminism.1 56 However,
the following Subsection suggests that within the context of a largely gender-
biased judiciary, pervasive insecurity, and women's low socio-economic status,
the confusion resulting from legal hybridity in Afghanistan seriously constrains
the potential of Islamic feminism. 157
3. Ambiguity Regarding the Law
The co-existence of regimes of customary, Islamic, and statutory law has
combined with decades of statelessness, lack of education, and poor judicial
training to foster considerable confusion as to the law that is currently in force
154. "Women... are almost entirely excluded from participation as either jirga members or
disputants." CLASH OF Two GOODS, supra note 141, at 9. "[F]ormal bodies of local governance, dispute
settlement and arbitration such as tribal jirgas or village shuras... tend to be all-male assemblies."
KANDIYOTI, supra note 3; see also WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK, supra note 39, at 36.
155. KANDIYOTI, supra note 3, at 25 (citing UNIFEM, AFGHANISTAN: WOMEN IN THE NEWS, NO.
23, at 2 (Mar. 20-25, 2004)).
156. See supra note 21 (describing transnational and domestic Islamic feminist efforts).
157. Farida Shaheed has observed that "whenever the coexistence of multiple legal systems
provides an option on the same issue, all too frequently the one least favorable to women is the one that
is implemented." Farida Shaheed, Controlled or Autonomous: Identity and the Experience of the
Network, Women Living Under Muslim Laws, 19 SIGNS 997, 1000 (1994). The goal of Islamic feminists
like WLUML is to fight against this result by providing information and resources to aid local Muslim
women in their promotion of alternative interpretations of Islamic law. Id. at 1009.
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in Afghanistan. Ordinary citizens are largely unaware of the sources of law or
the rights they afford. 158 This problem is particularly acute with respect to the
rights of women and their legal status. Legal ambiguity thereby acts as another
potential constraint on the efforts of Islamic feminist advocates to use the law
as a vehicle to promote women's rights. A primary example of this confusion is
the uncertain status of detained women in Afghanistan. During his June 2002
visit to Afghanistan, scholar Martin Lau observed that approximately thirty
women were held in a Kabul jail. 159 Based on information provided by the Law
Section of the Ministry of Women's Affairs, Lau reported that the majority of
these women were detained for "crimes" that have no foundation in Afghan
criminal law or Islamic law, such as "refusing to live with their [abusive]
husbands, refusing to marry a husband chosen by their parents, or for having
run away from either the parental or the matrimonial home."' 60 Uncertain of
their rights and without advocates to fight for their release, women often
remain in jail under such false pretenses. Lau remarked that, shockingly, not
only did detained women have little information about their legal rights, but
even the attorneys at the Ministry of Women's Affairs lacked knowledge about
women's rights and the lawfulness of their imprisonment. 161
Confusion surrounding the applicable law undermines the impact of even
existing laws that seek to advance women's rights. In 1977, Afghanistan passed
a civil law that introduced significant reforms of family law by revising
provisions of Hanafi jurisprudence in force at the time. The Afghan Civil Code
of 1977 permits women to choose their spouses, mandates state registration of
all marriages, requires girls to reach the age of fifteen before marriage, and
raises the age of consent for marriage to sixteen for girls and eighteen for
boys. 162 The Civil Code also reforms classical Hanafi divorce law by ceasing to
recognize a man's pronouncement of talaq (unilateral divorce) while
intoxicated. 163 While the law does not outlaw polygamy, in order for a man to
enter a second marriage, he must prove that it will not cause injustice to any
wife, that he can provide materially for all wives, and that he has a lawful
reason for taking an additional wife, such as the first wife's serious illness or
barrenness. 164 Failure to prove these conditions provides the grounds for a
158. MPI REPORT, supra note 34, at 10 ("It can be estimated that 90% of the population have only
a very vague idea of what the concept of law implies or what the sources of law are.").
159. LAU, supra note 142, at 25.
160. Id.; see also KANDIYOTI, supra note 3, at 25. The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, Yakin Ertfirk, similarly observed during her 2005 visit that most women in Afghanistan's
prisons were "detained on charges related to sexual offences, such as adultery, illicit sexual intercourse
or prostitution" or for offenses like "'running away from home' [which are] clearly not ... offence[s]
under criminal or Islamic law." UN Special Rapporteur Report on Afghanistan, supra note 110, 41.
161. LAU, supra note 142, at 25.
162. Id. at 24. The Afghan Civil Code of 1977 differentiates between the minimum age required for
girls to marry and the "legal capacity" to marry. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 24-25.
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court's refusal to register the marriage.' 65 Significantly, the 1977 Afghan Civil
Code permits a woman to seek judicial divorce if her husband fails to make
such a showing, 166 thereby expanding the traditional grounds for tafriq divorce
in Hanafi law. It also allows a woman to include a clause in her marriage
contract granting her the option to initiate divorce if her husband attempts to
take a second wife, whether or not he fulfills the statutory conditions.
67
Finally, the Code expands the grounds for judicial divorce from those permitted
in classical Hanafi law to include the husband's affliction with an "incurable
disease," his failure to financially support his wife, and his absence or
imprisonment under certain conditions.'
68
Despite the existence of the Afghan Civil Code of 1977, identifying the
current family law (or any law, for that matter) in force in Afghanistan is a
difficult task, particularly since the country has seen six different governments
or ruling coalitions since 1964, each of which led to the promulgation of a new
constitution or new basic laws for the country.' 69 The impact of frequent
regime change has been exacerbated by nearly three decades of civil and
political conflict, which together have caused the "withering away" of the
Afghan Civil Code of 1977 and the reintroduction of "largely unreformed
Hanafi family law and customary law into the sphere of family law."'
' 70
Inadequate resources and lack of training for Afghan judges also compound
this problem. During the course of over two decades of conflict and Taliban
rule, most statutes were destroyed or lost.' 71 As of 2003, judges, lawyers, and
educational institutions all lacked "access to applicable statutes and associated
legal materials.' 172 Despite a report that copies of Afghanistan's principal legal
codes were disseminated throughout the country by various NGOs, 173 the UN
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women observed in 2005 that many
165. Id. at 25.
166. Id.
167. Id. This type of divorce is reminiscent of tawfid (divorce by stipulation), but more expansive
since a woman may include such a clause in her marriage contract absent her husband's delegation of
his right to divorce. For a definition of tawfid and discussion of delegated divorce, see sources cited
supra note 54 (setting forth classical Islamic divorce law).
168. LAU, supra note 142, at 25.
169. CLASH OF Two GOODS, supra note 141, at 19. In other words, "the corpus of statutory laws
presents itself in layers, each layer representing particular periods of governance." LAU, supra note 142,
at 9. Since the promulgation of the 1964 Constitution of Afghanistan, the country has witnessed the
proposal of six constitutions, of which five were ratified. CLASH OF TWO GOODS, supra note 141, at 19.
While the Taliban did not develop a constitution after they assumed power, they sought to "implement[]
Shari'a law" through a "series of repressive decrees." INT'L CRISIS GROUP, AFGHANISTAN: WOMEN AND
RECONSTRUCTION (Mar, 14, 2003), http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report-archive/
A400919 14032003.pdf; see supra note 75. Each of these regimes engaged in significant lawmaking,
and the task of determining which law remains in force and should be applied is both political and
controversial. LAU, supra note 142, at 20.
170. LAU, supra note 142, at 25.
171. Id. at 4.
172. Id.
173. MPI REPORT, supra note 34, at 8.
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judges "have no knowledge of the official legal system and no access to
collections of laws or official gazettes .... 174
Confused by the competing statutory, Islamic, and customary laws,
deficient in training or education as to secular law, lacking access to legal texts,
and lacking even a general awareness of the formal legal system, many judges
in the formal sector apply their own conceptions of the law to disputes rather
than applying the law on the books.175 According to a 2005 report by the Max
Planck Institute, judges of the high courts and members of local jirgas
(assemblies) report that the sources of family law in Afghanistan include
customary law, Islamic law, and the Afghan Civil Code of 1977.176 While most
of the family-law regulations of the Civil Code are based on the Hanaf school
of law, significant portions of the Code departed from this school of law by
adopting provisions from Maliki jurisprudence, such as those expanding the
grounds for female-initiated divorce detailed above. 177 However, in practice,
judges and jirga members report that "uncodified classical hanafi law is
considered the main source of law."' 78 Thus, even if more progressive
interpretations of Islamic law are incorporated within the civil code from other
schools of Islamic law through the application of doctrines such as ta/fiq and
takhayyur, or from a revisiting of the Qur'an and Sunna, Afghan judges and
jirga members on the ground may bypass these revised laws to implement
stricter Hanaf! interpretations.' 79
This practice of judicial discretion in the face of the statutory code is
particularly harmful to women in the realm of divorce. Not only have judges
nullified divorce rights for women drawn from Maliki law and incorporated in
the Afghan Civil Code of 1977 by simply applying Hanafi law, they have even
denied rights granted to women under Hanafi law itself. For example, the
Afghan Civil Code of 1977 permits women to seek a judicial separation in
certain limited circumstances, such as those permissible under the classical
Hanafi conception of tafriq.18° Reports indicate that in practice, however,
174. UN Special Rapporteur Report on Afghanistan, supra note 110. In his 2003 study of legal
institutions in Afghanistan, Lau discovered that "[n]ot a single court visited.., in either Kabul or
Mazar-e-Sharif had access to or a collection of Afghanistan's main statutory laws. Even the Ministry of
Justice and the University of Kabul do not hold complete sets of Afghanistan's statutory laws and
regulations." LAU, supra note 142, at 7. International groups have sought to assist Afghan authorities in
rectifying this problem, including by collecting, reprinting, and providing copies to the Ministry of
Justice. Id.
175. CLASH OF Two GOODS, supra note 141, at 20.
176. MPI REPORT, supra note 34, at 8.
177. Id. The Hanaf school of Islamic law gained authority "as the basis for judicial decision-
making" in 1885 when Amir Abdur Rahman adopted the Asas al-quzat (Fundamentals for Judges) as a
"code of procedure and ethics." CLASH OF Two GOODS, supra note 141.
178. MPI REPORT, supra note 34, at 8.
179. Id.
180. LAU, supra note 142, at 25. One such circumstance permitted by classical Hanafi law and the
1977 Afghan Civil Code is when a woman's husband is missing. Id.
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judges do not apply the Code. 81 The head of the provincial court of Kunduz
reported that there is no such thing as a "divorce" for women and that women
have only the right to "separation" whereas men have the right to divorce even
without a reason. 182 Legal ambiguity in Afghanistan is exacerbated by the
Supreme Court's recruitment of judges from madrasas (religious schools),
where judges are instructed in Islamic law but not statutory law,183 and from
judges' lack of understanding of the formal justice system or secular law due
both to their skewed training and to the unavailability of legal texts. Together,
these forces permit judges "to apply what they perceive as sharia over the
secular law," even if the latter may have been specifically instituted to promote
women's rights.' 84 In addition, even when interpreting Islamic law, judges
often differ in their understanding from religious leaders and others working
within customary law institutions, undermining even the consistent application
of Islamic laws that are beneficial to women. 185 Despite the constitutional
provision that permits the default application of Hanafi law only in the narrow
segment of cases in which no statutory law applies, in practice, judges apply
Hanafi law to a far wider range of issues.
The politicization and gender bias of the judiciary, the weakness of the
formal legal system, and the lack of clarity surrounding applicable law threaten
to counteract the transformative potential of Islamic feminists to reform Islamic
law through the passage of legislation in the Afghan Parliament. These
structural features of the Afghan judiciary permit unelected judges to apply
their own conceptions of Hanafi law even when Hanafi provisions have been
superseded by statute or when these conceptions fail to accurately capture
Hanafi law itself. Structural characteristics of the Afghan judicial system may
therefore limit the capacity and impact of those who seek to advance women's
rights through changes in Islamic law.
B. Insecurity
As the Afghan women stated at the conference where women wrote the
Afghan Women's Bill of Rights, "the law and the constitution are one thing on
paper, and practices around the country... are quite another."' 86 Even if
advocates for women's rights institute legal reforms in parliament, and
progressive members of the judiciary do not strike them for violating Article 3
181. Id.
182. MPI REPORT, supra note 34, at 8.
183. See id.; UN Special Rapporteur Report on Afghanistan, supra note 110 (explaining that judges
in the formal system often serve simultaneously in "traditional dispute resolution mechanisms" and as
"religious mullahs").
184. UN Special Rapporteur Report on Afghanistan, supra note 110.
185. Jacinto, supra note 41, at 9-10.
186. Carlotta Gall, Women Gather in Afghanistan to Compose a Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 2003, at A16.
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of the constitution, what impact will such laws have in improving women's
lives in a country where the state has almost no authority and public space
remains extremely dangerous?1
8 7
The creation of spaces to help women promote their own rights is premised
upon the existence of a basic level of physical security about which Afghan
women can currently only dream. Without this basic security, any Islamic
feminist activism in Afghanistan is circumscribed by the places where women
can travel and the social space they may occupy in their dissent against
prevailing gender hierarchies. Unfortunately, insecurity is not only endemic,
but increasing in parts of Afghanistan such as the south. 88 It has been
identified as "the overwhelming challenge characterizing all aspects of daily
life for Afghan women,"' 89 and is indelibly linked to the perpetuation of
violence against women. After her 2005 visit to Afghanistan, the UN Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women reported that "violence against
women remains dramatic in its intensity, in both public and private spheres of
life."' 190 Women running for and serving in parliament have been attacked and
threatened. 19 1 Reports indicate that honor killings of women and female self-
immolation have increased, and that women and girls continue to experience
trafficking, forced prostitution, kidnapping, rape, and assault. 192 Female aid
workers have been specifically targeted for murder and rape. 193 Violence
against women also persists in the form of forced marriage, including child
marriage and domestic abuse. 94 Hostile law enforcement authorities exacerbate
187. Afghanistan faces increasing violence and insecurity in a rapidly deteriorating security
situation created by the interlocking effects of the insurgency by Taliban and other anti-government
forces in the southern and eastern parts of the country, and a steep rise in drug trafficking and related
crimes. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 100, at 1. General violence and targeted attacks have impacted
government officials, religious figures, schools, aid workers, and civilians. Id. at 5-6; see also David
Rohde, Afghan Symbol for Change Becomes a Symbol of Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at A1.
188. Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Bush, Karzai, Musharraf Must Act Now to Stop Militant
Abuses (Sept. 27, 2006), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/09/271afghan14272_txt.htm.
189. AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS FIVE YEARS ON, supra note 96, at 7. "Women and girls have
been particularly affected by the insecurity [in Afghanistan] and have seen a significant erosion of the
few rights they had regained after the fall of the Taliban." Human Rights Watch, supra note 188.
190. UN Special Rapporteur Report on Afghanistan, supra note 110, T 19.
191. The September 2005 elections in Afghanistan witnessed death threats against female
candidates. The election commission reported to BBC that five female candidates were killed and one
was missing. Afghan Woman Candidate Attacked, BBC NEWS, Sept. 7, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south asia/4224070.stm. MP Malalai Joya has spoken out about the threats to her own and her family's
safety. WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK, supra note 39, at 27.
192. AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS FIVE YEARS ON, supra note 96, at 7, 11, 15-17; UN Special
Rapporteur Report on Afghanistan, supra note 110, 20-21; Kim Sengupta, The Woman Who Defied
the Taliban and Paid with Her Life, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 26, 2006, available at
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/articlel757264.ece. "The United Nations estimates that
annually there are 5000 honor killings . . . " Juliette Terzieff, In Afghanistan, Danger Still Stalks
Women, WOMEN'S E-NEWS, June 10, 2005, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm?aid=2330.
193. See AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS FIVE YEARS ON, supra note 96, at 12 ("Three women [were]
raped and killed in Baghlan province in May 2005.").
194. Id. at 7; UN Special Rapporteur Report on Afghanistan, supra note 110, 23; Golnaz
Esfandiari, Afghanistan: Interview with UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, RADIO
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women's experience of violence and insecurity by disregarding complaints,
refusing protection, preventing access to divorce, and failing to redress
harms.195 As a result, Afghan women's groups have identified personal security
as the most pressing issue facing Afghan women in this decade.'
96
Most troubling to the cause of Islamic feminism is the concerted attack on
women's rights advocates by the Taliban and other forces. In September 2006,
Safiye Amajan, a trailblazer for Pashtun women's rights and the head of the
Kandahar province Department of Women's Affairs (DoWA), was murdered
by Taliban gunmen outside of her home.' 97 Her killing was not an isolated
incident. Death threats have been made against the female heads of the DoWA
in at least nine Afghan provinces.' 98 DoWA leaders have received threats
through telephone calls, nighttime postings in public places, and hand-delivered
messages to their workplaces. 99 Amnesty International reports that female
human rights defenders "face threats, acid attacks and fear of reprisals against
their families., 200 One women's rights activist wrote in a letter to Amnesty
International,
What really threatens women in Kandahar province these days is their
overall security and safety while outdoors; safety amid terrorist threats
from the extremist and regrouped Taleban and the ongoing fighting
between government forces and militants in the region. For this reason,
women do not dare come out of their homes and send their girls to
schools.20 '
She also reported that there were recent terrorist killings by the Taliban "to stop
women from coming out of their houses to work for their livelihood., 20 2 As a
result of threatening phone calls, this particular activist was forced to keep a
low profile. 20 3 Lacking adequate protection from a weak government, female
women's rights advocates are left to protect themselves. The security situation
is further complicated by the fact that providing government security to women
serving in the DoWA, or arranging for meetings between DoWA and women's
FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, July 26, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/ 2005/07/99775c66-
b885-4308-a3dc- 16f9051643a9.html.
195. WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK, supra note 39, at 29; UN Special Rapporteur Report on
Afghanistan, supra note 110, 50.
196. Riphenburg, supra note 70, at 189.
197. Amnesty Int'l, Afghanistan: Killing of Safiye Amajan Violates Laws of War and Signals Need
for Protection of Activists, Sept. 25, 2006, http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/
document.do?id=ENGASA 110162006; Sengupta, supra note 192.
198. Amnesty Int'l, Afghanistan: The Challenges of Defending Women's Rights in Kandahar,
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/afg-241006-feature-eng (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
199. Id
200. WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK, supra note 39, at 27.
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groups to take place in secured government buildings, may actually attract
more attention and further endanger the lives of women's rights activists.
2 4
There is widespread consensus among domestic and international women's
rights advocates that the Afghan government cannot promote women's rights
without improving security throughout the country. To achieve this goal,
human rights organizations have called upon the international community and
the United States to expand their security forces and to specifically provide
security for female members of parliament, girls seeking to attend school, and
205
women escaping violence. In the meantime, observers must realistically
assess the potential effectiveness of Islamic feminist advocacy as a means of
promoting women's rights in present day Afghanistan by acknowledging the
significant constraints posed by the security situation on women's ability to
exercise and promote their rights.
C. Limited Socio-Economic Development
No formal study has established a causal relationship between socio-
economic indicators and women's participation in Islamic feminism. However,
unlike women in states such as Iran and Malaysia, which have witnessed an
astonishing flurry of Islamic feminist activity, Afghan women have sustained
serious blows to their health, education, and well-being in recent years. While
206Iranian and Malaysian women boast high rates of literacy, decades of
conflict have resulted not only in widespread female illiteracy in Afghanistan,
204. Id.
205. AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS FIVE YEARS ON, supra note 96, at 10; Benazeer Roshan, The
More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Plight of Afghan Women Two Years After the
Overthrow of the Taliban, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 270, 282 (2004); Human Rights Watch, supra
note 188.
206. The adult female literacy rate, defined as "[t]he percentage of people ages 15 and older who
can, with understanding, both read and write a short, simple statement related to their everyday life," is
seventy percent in Iran and eighty-five percent in Malaysia. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME,
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL WATER
CRISIS 364 tbl. 24 (2006), available at http://hdr.undp.orgihdr2006/pdfs/report/ HDR 2006_Tables.pdf.
Morocco, another country where Islamic feminists have experienced notable successes, has an adult
literacy rate of forty percent, far lower than the rate in Iran or Malaysia. UNITED NATIONS DEV.
PROGRAMME, supra, at 365 tbl. 24. Yet the rates of all three countries considerably exceed that of
Afghanistan, estimated by Afghanistan's first National Human Development Report to be fourteen
percent. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT: SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE 14 (2004), available at
http://www.undp.org.af/nhdr_04/pdfs/statistical%20indicators%20template.pdf (drawing upon 2003
reports to estimate the adult female literacy rate); see also Bay Fang, School's Out: Afghan Girls Are
Losing the Ground They Recently Gained, MS. MAG., Fall 2006, available at
http://www.msmagazine.com/fa112006/schoolsout.asp (estimating the current female illiteracy rate to be
eighty percent or higher). While figures should be compared with caution due to differences in data
collection across countries and the difficulty of gathering data in the conflict situation of Afghanistan,
the reports suggest that Iran, Malaysia, and Morocco do have far higher rates of adult female literacy
than Afghanistan. Together, these statistics suggest that while no particular rate is determinative, female
literacy may be one factor that in certain contexts promotes women's ability to engage in Islamic
feminism.
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but also serious difficulties in implementing female education, a pronounced
deterioration in women's health, and a deep and persistent lack of economic
opportunities for women. A recent report issued by the United Nations
Research Institute for Social Development noted, "[h]uman development
indicators such as levels of education, life expectancy, maternal and infant
mortality, and access to education and health services place the women of
Afghanistan among the most disadvantaged in the world. It will take years of
sustained investment in infrastructure and services to ameliorate this
situation. ' 2°7 Afghan girls' and women's relative illiteracy, limited access to
education, and economic dependence may prevent them from seizing the
spaces available in the post-Taliban order to challenge dominant interpretations
of Islam and Islamic law that subvert their rights.
The potential of women's limited socio-economic development to
constrain their ability to engage in Islamic feminist advocacy is aptly illustrated
by the state of female education in Afghanistan. Central to Islamic feminism is
the concept of ijtihad, the process by which an individual uses her
"interpretation and independent reasoning" to understand the Qur'an and Sunna
and apply their teachings to life circumstances. 20 8 As Azizah al-Hibri has
explained, "Each individual has direct access to the Qur'an and hadith [the
recorded Sunna of the Prophet] and is in principle entitled to engage in O'tihad,
so long as she has the requisite knowledge. ' 2°9 Leela Jacinto warns that
"[w]omen's access to secular and religious education is critical for the potential
success of feminist ij'tihad.' '210 Her claim is persuasive. Women and girls'
capacity to confront understandings of Islam and Islamic law that are contrary
to their own interests and desires is premised on their ability to engage with
Islamic sources, to articulate their interpretations in the common language of
Islamic discourse, and to persuade others, particularly male leaders, including
family members, mullahs (religious clerics), tribal leaders, judges, and
legislators.
Since the fall of the Taliban, women and girls' prospects for education
have expanded. While the Taliban banned female education, 211 women and
girls currently face no formal barriers to attending school. In 2002, Afghan girls
began re-enrolling in primary schools and Afghan women sat for university
entrance exams, ending the Taliban's prohibition of women's higher
207. KANDIYOTI, supra note 3, at 32.
208. Jacinto, supra note 41, at 12.
209. Azizah Yahia al-Hibri, Muslim Women's Rights in the Global Village: Challenges and
Opportunities, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 37, 44 (2000).
210. Jacinto, supra note 41, at 12.
211. Drumbl, supra note 11, at 354-55 ("Under the Taliban's regime of sexual apartheid...
[s]chools for girls older than eight years of age were closed."); UN Special Rapporteur Report on
Afghanistan, supra note 110, 7.
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212
education. These developments suggest improved possibilities for Islamic
feminist ijtihad in Afghanistan.
The reality on the ground, however, is not uniformly positive. Current
estimates hold that eighty percent or more of Afghanistan's female population
213is illiterate, 1 and Afghan girls and young women face serious obstacles to
accessing education. Although exact estimates are difficult to calculate, most
sources approximate that about one-third of Afghanistan's districts do not even
have schools for girls.214 Human Rights Watch and other observers have
highlighted the danger that confronts girls who try to attend school. 215 While
estimates remain rough, the number of children in school has risen from about
774,000 children in 2001 to approximately 5.2 million (a little over half of all
children) in 2006.216 Nevertheless, the pervasive lack of security in Afghanistan
noted above, and the rise of violent attacks and threats that are specifically
directed against girls who seek to attend school by armed opposition groups
(including Taliban, Taliban allies, and Pashtun warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's
Hezb-e Islami), have rolled back progress. 2 17 One primary school teacher
reported to Human Rights Watch that while walking toward school, she and her
students found a letter that said, in Pashto:
To all girls' students [sic] and school teachers, teaching in girls'
schools! We warn you to stop going to school, as it is a center made by
Americans. Any one who wants to go to school will be blown up. To
avoid such death, we warn you not to go to school.21 8
As a result of insecurity and targeted attacks on female education, boys in
primary school outnumber girls two to one throughout Afghanistan; in the
southern provinces, girls' underrepresentation is even more acute, with boys
outnumbering girls six to one.2 19 Without access to education-religious or
secular-girls and young women in Afghanistan face an uphill battle in
securing skills that would empower them to challenge their exclusion from
212. Riphenburg, supra note 70, at 199.
213. Fang, supra note 206.
214. Zama Coursen-Neff, The Taliban's War on Education, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2006, at BI I;
Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Bombs and Threats Shut Down Schools, HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS,
July 11, 2006, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/O6/afghan13700.htm.
215. Human Rights Watch issued a 142-page report documenting at least 204 incidents of attacks
on students, teachers, and schools since January 2005. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LESSONS IN TERROR:
ATTACKS ON EDUCATION IN AFGHANISTAN (2006) [hereinafter LESSONS IN TERROR]. This number
reflects an increase in attacks in late 2005 and the first half of 2006 in Afghanistan.
216. Id. at 7 nn. 1-2 (citing World Bank gender statistics and Afghan Ministry of Education reports);
see also Coursen-Neff, supra note 214 (citing World Bank estimates); UN Special Rapporteur Report on
Afghanistan, supra note 110, 18 (reporting that as of 2006, "four million children have enrolled in
school since the fall of the Taliban").
217. AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS FIVE YEARS ON, supra note 96, at 7. Human Rights Watch
found Taliban, Taliban allies, and Hekmatyar's followers to have instigated a large number of the
attacks on schools and teachers that it investigated. LESSONS IN TERROR, supra note 215, at 32-34;
Human Rights Watch, supra note 214.
218. LESSONS IN TERROR, supra note 215, at 66.
219. UN Special Rapporteur Report on Afghanistan, supra note 110, 18.
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formal and informal institutions of power through the interpretation and
reinterpretation of Islam.
A nuanced and realistic appraisal of the possibilities for women to engage
in Islamic feminist advocacy under Afghanistan's new constitutional order, and
more importantly, the potential for such advocacy to improve Afghan women's
lives, requires a deeper understanding of the constraints posed by the Afghan
context. Three overarching constraints-the structural deficiencies of the
Afghan judiciary, the pervasive lack of security in the country, and the low
socio-economic status of Afghan women-seriously limit the capacity of
women to exploit opportunities created by the 2004 Constitution of
Afghanistan and by Islamic jurisprudence to advance women's rights through
legal reform grounded in Islam. These constraints strengthen the hand of
unelected jurists who resist adopting understandings of Islamic and Afghan law
that encompass women's rights and seek to curb formal legal advances for
women secured by Islamic feminists in the Afghan Parliament. They also limit
the impact of even successful reforms of the formal law to concretely better the
lives of women on the ground. These challenges, however, are not peculiar to
Afghanistan. Indeed, they confront many countries plagued by longstanding
conflict and struggling with low levels of socio-economic development.
Moreover, even as these factors serve as constraints, women in Afghanistan
have used them to identify places for further advocacy, as in the case of calls
for the inclusion of more women in the judiciary and efforts to highlight the
disjuncture between Islamic law and customary law practices identified as
harmful to women.
CONCLUSION
The impact of Islam and constitutionalism on women's rights is a pressing
question in today's era of increased attention to democracy and constitution-
making in the Muslim world.220 This Comment challenges observers, both
Muslim and non-Muslim, domestic and international, who conclude that the
incorporation of Islam into constitutions will necessarily or definitively harm
women, before they consider the legal, political, and social landscape of the
220. For various strands in the debate about Islam and democracy, see NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER
JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY (2003); Susanna Dokupil, The
Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modern Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 53
(2002); El Fadl, supra note 17; Noah Feldman & Roman Martinez, Constitutional Politics and Text in
the New Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (2006); Erik G. Jensen,
Confronting Misconceptions and Acknowledging Imperfections: A Response to Khaled Abou El Fadl's
"Islam and Democracy," 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 81 (2003); and Travis, supra note 9.
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country in question. It argues for a contextualized inquiry and seeks to evaluate
the impact of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan on advocacy for women's
rights through such an approach.
Part I of this Comment demonstrated that Islamic feminism exists in
Afghanistan for good reason. Many Afghan Muslim women are sincere
adherents of Islam who believe that the rights afforded to them by their religion
currently elude them in their daily lives. They also acknowledge that the project
of promoting women's rights must occur within an Islamic framework to avoid
unleashing backlash and to gain legitimacy in the eyes of a mainstream Muslim
population. For these reasons, many Muslim women in Afghanistan view
reform through Islam and Islamic law as a strategy that both resonates with
their sensibilities and holds greater transformative potential than methods
divorced from Islam. Part II highlighted the competing provisions of the 2004
Constitution of Afghanistan that may assist or curb this Islamic feminist effort.
The constitution offers an equality provision, space for legal borrowing from
alternative schools of Islamic law, support for the enforcement of the country's
international obligations, and a quota for women's representation in the Afghan
Parliament. Islamic feminists may use these tools to encourage the passage of
progressive legislation, the implementation of existing promises, and the
adoption of judicial interpretations of Islamic law that promote women's rights.
The constitution also introduces judicial review to keep legislation in line with
undefined Islamic "beliefs and provisions," placing significant power into the
hands of an unelected judiciary. Based on an analysis of its text alone, however,
it is impossible to determine whether the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, on
the whole, helps or harms Afghan women.
Part III sought to provide a nuanced and contextualized inquiry to reach a
deeper understanding of the answer to this question by exploring the legal and
extra-legal constraints on women's ability to use legal reform to advance their
rights in Afghanistan. These constraints are considerable. The structural
characteristics of the Afghan legal system-the politicization and gender-bias
of the judiciary, the weakness of the formal legal system, and the lack of clarity
surrounding applicable law-render judicial review a serious threat to
enactment and enforcement of women's rights legislation. They also suggest
the existence of serious institutional barriers to persuading judges to adopt
understandings of Islamic and Afghan law that encompass women's rights.
Pervasive insecurity and women's low socio-economic status also harm
women's abilities to engage in Islamic feminism and mitigate the potential of
formal legal reform to improve the status of women. These constraints suggest
that while the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan provides vitally important tools
for Afghan Islamic feminists, these advocates will nevertheless continue to face
formidable challenges.
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While legal reform in Afghanistan may have a limited impact in improving
women's lives, law remains a vital avenue for change, one more means by
which women may use their own voices to advocate for their rights. The 2004
Constitution of Afghanistan did not deliver to women the demands made in the
Afghan Women's Bill of Rights. Yet the constitution has created a space-albeit
a constrained one-in which Afghan women may advance their status by using
the language and idioms of Islam to contest proffered interpretations of Islamic
law or customary law that curtail their rights and opportunities. In doing so,
women issue calls for change in a register that resonates with them, one that
they have determined carries legitimacy in their own country. The
acknowledgement that constraints-political, institutional, social and legal-
confine their effort does not highlight the futility of Islamic feminism in
Afghanistan or lead to the wholesale conclusion that the constitutional
incorporation of Islam will inevitably cause further oppression of women.
Rather, this acknowledgement suggests that it is important to set realistic goals,
address obstacles confronting Islamic feminism, and provide external support
in a manner identified by indigenous advocates themselves. It does more
service to Afghan women to understand that, despite considerable barriers,
Afghan Islamic feminists may exploit the spaces afforded by their constitution
and religion to further women's rights. Appreciating their capacity to do so
acknowledges their convictions, their pragmatism, and their agency. Most
importantly, it recognizes that Afghan women themselves are best able to
devise the paths for improving their own lives.
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